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ABSTRACT 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has maintained the dominant 
role in the international system, a role that has come to be challenged by certain small 
states.  Presenting a four-tier model of the international system, this thesis examines how 
United States’ preponderance is being challenged.  In focusing on Venezuela as a case 
study, this thesis addresses the question: How has Hugo Chavez challenged U.S. 
preponderance regionally and internationally while protecting his Bolivarian Revolution 
for Venezuela?  The research analyzes the methods small states utilize to challenge great 
power spheres of influence. Analyzing the elements of soft power and the processes of 
soft balancing as employed by small states, this thesis seeks to fill a void in the academic 
literature concerning both concepts as applied to small states.  Furthermore, pursuing 
research into this topic provides a better understanding of the threat perceptions behind 
small state rejection of American unilateralism.  If international peace, or at the very least 
stability, is to be actualized, then understanding the third and fourth order effects of U.S. 
foreign policy is imperative to such purposes. 
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I. PREPONDERANCE CHALLENGED 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The hegemonic pretensions of the American empire are placing at risk the 
very survival of the human species…the American empire is doing all it 
can to consolidate its system of domination.  And we cannot allow them to 
do that.  We cannot allow world dictatorship to be consolidated. 
— Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, in his address to the United 
Nations on September 20, 2006.1 
 
At the end of the Cold War, many scholars argued that the international system 
was becoming unipolar, one led by a single superpower with unequaled economic and 
military might.2  During this period, the United States assumed the role as the preeminent 
global power, so the argument goes, and quickly demonstrated its unparalleled military 
power and projection capabilities during the first Gulf War.  The 2003 Iraq War is a 
ready testament to the willingness of the United States to assert and defend its interests 
abroad.  The willingness to assert power abroad via destructive means is indicative of a 
U.S. foreign policy that has become increasingly unilateral under the Bush 
Administration.   
Many have written on how great powers respond to other great powers, but less 
attention is paid to small powers.  In 1968, Robert Rothstein asserted that the view of the 
international order by small powers “is different in kind, and not merely in degree” from 
great powers.  Ultimately, Rothstein asserts that “Small Powers think and act differently, 
and any analysis which fails to take that into account is bound to be simplistic and 
 
1 Hugo Chavez, Chavez Address to the United Nations on 20 September 2006. 
www.commondreams.org/cgi-bin/print.cgi?file=/views06/0920-22.htm, (accessed on November 29, 2006.) 
2 These assertions have been made by many scholars.  William C. Wohlforth quantifies U.S. 
hegemony by comparing gross domestic product, military expenditures, and power capabilities as 
percentage of hegemon from 1870 to 1997; see, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 
24, no. 1 (Summer, 1999), 5-41, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-
2889%28199922%2924%3A1%3C5%3ATSOAUW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U (accessed August 10, 2007). 
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inadequate.”3  The differences between great power and small power views of the world 
include those on democracy, human rights issues, economic systems, and especially, 
threat perceptions.   
The rising concern of small powers in regard to U.S. unilateralism is a logical 
response given current events. The relationship between the United States and Venezuela 
is no different.  There is little debate concerning the role of the United States in 
influencing world events.  The unfortunate consequences of U.S. unilateral action under 
the auspices of the Global War on Terrorism are evident around the world.  The current 
predicament in Iraq attests not only to the strength and long reach of its hard power 
capabilities, but demonstrates the willingness of its administration to protect perceived 
U.S. interests throughout the globe regardless of international norms.  Issues of 
international law, such as national sovereignty and use of force, are being pushed into the 
background under the Global War on Terror.  The power and influence that the United 
States appears to wield lead many statesmen, such as Venezuelan President Hugo 
Chavez, to conclude that today’s world is unipolar and hegemonic.4 The international 
order as viewed by leaders of small states like Chavez is perceived to be threatening.  So 
how can small states leaders hope to challenge hegemonic powers in the international 
system? 
This thesis seeks to answer the question: How has Hugo Chavez challenged U.S. 
preponderance regionally and internationally while protecting his Bolivarian Revolution 
for Venezuela?  In focusing on Venezuela as a case study, this thesis addresses the 
broader question: How might small states challenge the U.S. dominance in the 
international system?  The research analyzes the methods small states utilize to challenge 
great power spheres of influence.  Analyzing the elements of soft power and the 
processes of soft balancing as employed by small states, this thesis seeks to fill a void in 
the academic literature concerning both concepts as applied to small states.  Furthermore, 
pursuing research into this topic provides a better understanding of the threat perceptions 
 
3 Rothstein, Robert L., Alliances and Small Powers, (NY: Columbia University Press, 1968), 1. 
4 Hugo Chavez, , “Address to the United Nations, September 20, 2006). 
http://www.commondreams.org/views06/0920-22.htm (accessed November 29, 2006). 
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behind small state rejection of American unilateralism.  If international peace, or at the 
very least stability, is to be actualized, then understanding the third and fourth order 
effects of U.S. foreign policy is imperative to such purposes. 
B. THE WORLD ORDER: UNIPOLAR? 
As stated above, following the end of the Cold War, many scholars proclaimed 
the coming of a unipolar world order.  However, nearly two decades after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, is it reasonable to claim that the international system has remained 
unipolar?  Understanding what constitutes a unipolar international system and the United 
State’s place therein is imperative for developing this study because it helps to identify 
the hierarchy of states, in turn, identifying state interests according to status.  In order to 
accomplish this task, three leading scholars on the subject are reviewed, William C. 
Wohlforth, John Ikenberry, and Robert Jervis.5   
In his piece, “The Stability of the Unipolar World,” Wohlforth defines unipolarity 
as the “structure in which one state’s capabilities are too great to be counterbalanced.”6  
He argues that after the fall of the Soviet Union, “the United States emerged as the sole 
surviving superpower;”7 in that no other nation possessed the economic and military 
might held by the United States at the end of the Cold War.  Furthermore, Wohlforth 
notes that, “The [U.S] has maintained its military supremacy; added to its share of world 
product, manufactures, and high-technology production; increased its lead in 
productivity; and regained or strengthened its lead in many strategic industries.”8  Citing 
 
5 The three works surveyed by these authors are: G. John Ikenberry, "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, 
and the Persistence of American Postwar Order," International Security 23, no. 3 (Winter, 1998), 43-78, 
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-
2889%28199824%2F199924%2923%3A3%3C43%3AISRATP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-G (accessed 
8/10/2007).; Robert 1940- Jervis, "The Remaking of a Unipolar World," The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 
3 (2006), 7-19, http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/washington_quarterly/v029/29.3jervis.html  (accessed 10 
August, 2007).; William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security 24, no. 
1 (Summer, 1999), 5-41, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-
2889%28199922%2924%3A1%3C5%3ATSOAUW%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U (accessed August 10, 2007). 
6 Wohlforth develops this definition from the logic of neorealist balance-of-power theory, see his 
notes., 9. 
7  Ibid., 5. 
8  Ibid., 11. 
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the components of power as listed by Kenneth Waltz, Wohlforth conducts both a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of states to demonstrate the United State’s polar 
position.9  These attributes have led to U.S. preponderance in the international system 
according to Wohlforth.   
Critics of unipolarity contend that it is unstable and dangerous and that its fate is 
written on the wall.  Three paths to its demise are envisioned: 1) counterbalancing by 
other states; 2) regional integration; 3) differential growth in power.10  Addressing the 
critics of unipolarity, Wolhforth argues that unipolarity is neither dangerous nor 
destabilizing for the international system.  Girding his theory that a unipolar world order 
lends to international stability, Wohlforth proposes two hypotheses: first, unipolarity is 
peaceful; second, unipolarity is durable.11  Basing his analysis on balance of power 
theory and hegemonic theory, Wohlforth contends that under the current system, second-
tier states will choose to bandwagon rather than balance. He extends the classic balance-
of-power logic that a bipolar system is better than a multipolar system, therefore it 
follows that a unipolar system is best; his main assertion being that unipolarity staves off 
hegemonic rivalry and security competition.12  His durability argument rests on the 
historical precedent of U.S. preponderance since the end of the Cold War.    He calls 
attention to the lack of balancing behavior by second-tier states, the lack of regional 
blocs, and the absence of any substantial growth in power relative to the United States. 
John Ikenberry takes an institutionalist approach to explaining the unipolar 
international order.  In doing so, he does not explicitly disagree with Wohlforth’s 
conclusions but identifies unipolar stability as a by product of the constitutionally based 
order constructed and supported by the United States.  He asserts that states have agreed 
to bind themselves to certain rules under international law which begets strategic restraint 
by the great powers.  Ultimately, the United States offered the great powers a deal, “If the 
 
9 The components of power as listed by Waltz are: size of population and territory; resource 
endowment; economic capabilities; military strength; and competence. Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics, 1st ed. (Boston, Mass.: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 131. 
10  Wohlforth, “The Stability of a Unipolar World,” 28. 
11  Ibid., 23-29. 
12  Ibid., 25-27. 
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U.S. would agree to operate within mutually acceptable institutions, thereby muting the 
implications of power asymmetries, the other countries would agree to be willing 
participants as well.”13  A commitment to self-restraint provided legitimacy to the 
unipolar international order and contributed to its durability as previously defined by 
Wohlforth.  Ikenberry concludes that this system is intrinsically stable as long as the 
polar power exercises self-restraint and operates within mutually accepted institutions. 
Robert Jervis agrees with Wohlforth’s and Ikenberry’s analyses of the U.S. 
position in the world.  In his piece, “The Remaking of a Unipolar World,” Jervis states, 
“Measured in any conceivable way, the United States has a greater share of world power 
than any other country in history…it is a hegemon in today’s unipolar world order.”14  
The bold assertion made by Jervis in this piece is that since the horrific attacks on 9/11, 
the United States has abandoned its status quo power status by adopting revolutionary 
foreign policies.  Jervis identifies three foreign policies of the Bush administration that 
magnify any sense of threat by other states; these are: 1) current doctrinal emphasis that 
peace and cooperation can exist only when all important states are democratic; 2) 
preserving the world order requires preemption (prevention); 3) the international system 
must be transformed.15 In this sense, a unipolar leader perceives threats by anything 
beyond its reach, such as threatening ideologies embodied by “rogue states,” and 
therefore will reject international law and constraints to protect itself.   
All three scholars agree that the rejection of institutional constraints on power is a 
dangerous road for American foreign policy.  Wohlforth concludes that, “the live-for-
today nature of U.S. domestic institutions may be the chief threat to unipolar stability.”16  
Preemptive foreign policy threatens to “break the bargain” made by the United States 
with the great powers as defined by Ikenberry.  Furthermore, U.S. power may not be as 
unfettered as conceived prior to the war in Iraq.  Evidence of this can be found in the 
United States inability to receive United Nations Security Council approval for military 
 
13  Ikenberry, Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order, 77. 
14  Jervis, The Remaking of a Unipolar World, 7. 
15  Ibid., 9. 
16  Wohlforth, The Stability of a Unipolar World, 41. 
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action in Iraq, and the refusal of such nations as Turkey and Saudi Arabia to provide 
launching pads for military operations.  This does not imply that the United States is not a 
great power, or is losing power (the U.S. obviously removed Sadaam Hussein without a 
U.N. blessing), but as Jervis mentions, “the very fact of its great power means that even 
those sympathetic to it will worry with good reason that their interests may be 
neglected”17 and possibly even infringed. 
Thus, the stability of the unipolar system is in danger.  U.S. unilateral initiatives 
in the post-9/11 environment threaten to awaken the realist fears of states – that a 
hegemonic international order led by a unilateralist U.S. threatens them.  Most threatened 
will be those states sitting on the lower rungs of the international order whose political 
ideologies do not mesh with U.S. expectations.  Traditional balance of power theory 
becomes more relevant in this hostile unipolar international order.  However, traditional 
balancing behavior has yet to materialize.  The available methods for balancing against a 
hegemon are discussed later.  The next section defines what is meant by small states and 
their third-tier status in a unipolar world order. 
C. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: A FOUR-TIERED MODEL 
This thesis adopts a four-tier model of the hierarchy of states in the international 
system to represent the operating environment of small states.  First, one must define a 
first-tier state.  The first-tier state is the leading pole in a unipolar world order.  Under a 
unipolar international system, there should realistically only be one first-tier state – as 
explained earlier the United States holds this position.  ‘Second-tier’ major powers, as 
they have come to be recognized in academic literature, are “states that possess the actual 
or potential capabilities to engage in balance-of-power coalition building against the 
United States.”18  These capabilities include robust economies, extensive international 
participation, significant military capabilities, and nuclear weapon capabilities or 
potential.  States included in this list are China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, 
 
17  Jervis, The Remaking of a Unipolar World, 17. 
18 This precise phrasing is by T.V Paul in “Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy,” however, it 
corresponds with Pape’s and others’ understanding of second-tier powers. 
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Germany, India, and Japan.19  Third-tier states represent those states not capable of 
engaging in traditional balancing techniques (such as militarily and economically) against 
the first tier state; yet, these states still actively participate in the international system.20  
Fourth-tier states represent those states that are weak and failing.   
The focus of this thesis is on third-tier states – specifically those, in particular 
Venezuela, that sit on the periphery of U.S. good graces.  Third-tier states cannot hope to 
challenge the United States utilizing traditional hard balancing.  This thesis argues that 
third-tier states have different threat perceptions than second-tier states that are more 
attuned to the actions of the first-tier state.  Whereas second-tier states may fear 
unilateralism as destabilizing, third-tier states fear it on a more national and concrete 
level.  Therefore, they are more likely to seek new ways to challenge the unilateral 
international order on defensive grounds.  The literature on soft balancing and soft power 
has largely ignored the utilization of these strategies by third states.  This paper seeks to 
fill the void in the academic literature by demonstrating that certain small states are 
engaging in soft balancing strategies and building soft power in an effort to guard against 
U.S. unilateral initiatives.   
1. Small State Rational Response 
Small states should be seen as rational actors in the realist sense. There are two 
key assumptions about states within the study of international relations that must be 
understood when explaining the rational actions of small, third-tier states.  First, “states 
are unitary actors who, at a minimum, seek their own preservation and, at a maximum, 
drive for universal domination.”21  Second, states seek sensible ways to use means 
available in order to achieve the ends in view.22  If major second-tier states are worried 
 
19 Germany and Japan are not nuclear states; however, their industrial and economic base would allow 
for rapid development and hence nuclear potential. 
20 Robert Rothstein defined a “Small Power” as a “[state] which recognizes that it can not obtain 
security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other 
states, institutions, processes, or developments to do so.”  See Alliances and Small Powers, (NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1968), 29. 
21 Waltz, The Theory of International Politics, 118. 
22 Ibid.  
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about the unilateralism and interventionist tendencies of U.S. foreign policy, to what 
magnitude should small states be concerned?  Small states are a much easier targets. 
Small states whose ideologies do not mesh with U.S. expectations are attractive 
targets for U.S. unilateral action for several reasons.  First, small states would appear to 
have significantly less influence in the international arena in order to diplomatically deter 
U.S. intervention.  Second, small states cannot hope to restrain U.S. military might on the 
battlefield.  As stated by T.V. Paul, second-tier major powers “do not fear losing their 
sovereignty and existential security to the reigning hegemon.”23  Small states cannot 
afford to assume this level of safety under the current international regime led by a 
unilateral U.S.  The current affairs in Venezuela under the tutelage of President Hugo 
Chavez provide an excellent case study in which to demonstrate this predicament. 
D. COVERT CHALLENGES: SOFT BALANCING & SOFT POWER 
1. Balance of Power Theory 
As one of the core concepts in international relations, balance of power theory 
remains somewhat ambiguous, therefore applicability to real world scenarios is difficult.  
Encapsulating the perplexity surrounding balance of power, Jack S. Levy notes the 
diversity of scholarly assumptions concerning the theory, “Some say a balance of power 
helps maintain the peace; others say it contributes to the onset of war; still others claim 
that the theory makes no determinant predictions about war and peace at all.  A scholar 
may use the balance of power concept to mean several different things, even in a single 
book.”24  Despite its problems, balance of power theory is still useful for explaining the 
behavior of states including small powers.  This thesis adopts the following assumption 
of balance of power theory as stated by Levy, “that states act rationally to maximize their 
 
23  Paul, Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy, 47. 
24  Jack S. Levy, "What do Great Powers Balance Against and when?" In Balance of Power: Theory 
and Practice in the 21st Century, eds. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2004), 29. Kenneth Waltz explains the perplexity of balance of power theory in 
Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 117. 
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security or power in anarchic systems without a higher authority to regulate disputes.”25  
The goal of avoiding hegemony in the international system is key to the concept of state 
security, when studying small state actions. 
In traditional balance of power theory, states will choose to either balance or 
bandwagon, or free ride.26  Up until the end of the Cold War, efforts to create balance in 
the international system largely constituted military means, intended to increase the 
power or threat of power of one state relative to another.  This process was epitomized in 
the military buildups of the United States and U.S.S.R.  Their efforts included raising 
their military budgets, strengthening their military power relative to the perceived threat 
of the other, and arming small power proxies.  In the bipolar international system of the 
Cold War, other large states took similar paths.  These methods included joining 
coalitions with other states whose combined strength attempts to balance that of the 
aggressor.  Ultimately, states allied in opposition to the principal source of their 
perceived threats.  This sort of balancing is traditionally known as hard balancing.   
For weaker states, traditional hard balancing via military means is not an option 
unless they have a superpower ally.27  Nevertheless, though a small or weaker state is 
unable to hard balance against a perceived threat, there may still be another option 
available in a relatively new concept – soft balancing.  The strategic utility of soft-
balancing lies within the concept of power.  The resources for power have moved beyond 
the military realm where measurement is fairly easy – simply count the number of 
soldiers and tanks.  As Keohane and Nye noted, “Power can be thought of as the ability 
of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do.  Power can also be 
 
25  Levy, What do Great Powers Balance Against and when?, 34. 
26 The nuances of balance of power theory have been expounded upon by many academics.  Here the 
author draws mainly from Waltz’s well-known, Theory of International Politics, 251. 
27 This seems a logical conclusion and has been argued by many scholars.  See, Robert Pape"Soft 
Balancing Against the United States," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 7-45, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v030/30.1pape.html (accessed July 15, 2007). and T. V. 
Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann, eds., Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st 
Century (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004).; T. V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of 
U.S. Primacy," International Security 30, no. 1 (2005): 46-71, 
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/international_security/v030/30.1paul.html. 
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conceived in terms of control over outcomes.”28  Understanding this aspect of power 
opens the floor for the discussion of methods for challenging preponderant power. 
2. Soft Balancing 
Traditional balance of power theorists maintain that “sustained hegemonies rarely 
if ever arise in multi-state systems, and a balancing coalition will form against any state 
that threatens to gain a position of hegemony that would enable it to impose its will on 
other states.”29  However, in the current international system, traditional balancing 
behavior has not materialized.  T.V. Paul argues that “second-tier major powers such as 
China, France, Germany, India, and Russia have mostly abandoned traditional ‘hard 
balancing’…because they do not fear losing their sovereignty and existential security to 
the reigning hegemon.”30  Nevertheless, Paul asserts that “increasing unilateralism of the 
United States” has raised the concerns of these second-tier states.  This concern has led to 
another type of balancing behavior called “soft balancing.” 
So what is “soft balancing”?  T.V. Paul defines it as state activity “which involves 
the formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes, especially at the United 
Nations, with the implicit threat of upgrading their alliances if the United States goes 
beyond its stated goals.”31  Under this definition, soft balancing encompasses two main 
components, diplomatic and economic.  Robert Pape expounds on this definition.  He 
defines soft balancing as “actions that do not directly challenge U.S. military 
preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine 
aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies.”32  For both Pape and Paul, these 
“nonmilitary tools” include international institutions, economic statecraft, and diplomatic 
arrangements.  Paul sets three conditions under which soft-balancing is likely to occur: 
First, “the hegemon’s power position and military behavior are of growing concern but 
 
28 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence : World Politics in Transition 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 11. 
29  Levy, What do Great Powers Balance Against and when?, 35. 
30  Paul, Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy, 47. 
31  Ibid., 47. 
32  Pape, Soft Balancing Against the United States, 10. 
 11
                                                
do not yet pose a serious challenge to the sovereignty of second-tier powers”; Second, 
“the dominant state is a major source of public goods in both the economic and security 
areas that can not simply be replaced”; Third, “the dominant state cannot easily retaliate 
either because the balancing efforts of others are not overt[ly] [threatening].”33  The 
United States has set these three conditions in motion; therefore, soft balancing has risen 
as the balancing behavior of second-tier states. 
According to Pape, “the international image of the United States as a benign 
superpower is declining, particularly with regard to the aspects that are likely to erode its 
relative immunity to balance of power dynamics.”34  Both Pape and Paul agree with the 
scholars of unipolarity that aggressive unilateral action by the United States in the post 
9/11 era has heightened the tensions of second-tier states toward the United States.  The 
focus on second-tier states misses a very important aspect of international relations 
because it encompasses only a small number of states in the world.  Small states that fall 
outside the academic focus are not less likely to attempt soft balancing than the larger 
powers.  In fact, this thesis argues that they are more likely due to the greater threat that 
U.S. unilateral initiatives pose to small states.  Intrinsic to soft balancing yet separate 
conceptually is soft power.  The next section defines soft power and explains its 
applicability to third-tier challenges to U.S. preponderance. 
3. Soft Power 
The traditional method for states to secure their interests abroad has been through 
hard power tactics that utilize superior military force and traditional “carrot and stick” 
applications.  As the international system moved toward unipolarity at the end of the 
Cold War, the use of hard power tactics by states, such as the threat of military force, as 
means to an end became less likely.  Joseph Nye contends that hard means have been 
replaced by softer tactics girded by ‘soft power’.  Nye first developed the concept of ‘soft 
power’ in his 1990 book, Bound to Lead, and then further developed it in his 2004 book, 
Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. 
 
33  Paul, Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy, 59. 
34  Pape, Soft Balancing Against the United States, 35. 
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So what is ‘soft power’?  Nye defines soft power as “the ability to get what you 
want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”35  It is the ability to shape the 
preferences of others by presenting your culture, political ideals, and policies as 
legitimate ends in and of themselves.  The currency of soft power rests not in military or 
economic coercion, but in “an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of 
contributing to the achievement of those values.”36  According to Nye, soft power 
behavior is exhibited through agenda setting, attraction through culture and political 
ideals, and co-optation.  The resources to exert soft power are found both domestically 
and internationally.  Domestically, a state draws on the attractiveness of its values, 
culture, and policies.  Internationally, states seek to set the agendas in international 
institutions that serve their ends.  When domestic and international resources are 
combined, states seek to co-opt a “coalition of the willing” that will help it to reach its 
goals. 
What does soft power mean for small, third-tier states?  Do small states possess 
enough of the currency of soft power to effectively leverage it against U.S. 
preponderance?  Where are the current examples of small state soft power?  These 
questions all serve to guide the thesis research.  In order to answer them, a case study of 
Venezuela, or rather Hugo Chavez’s current international anti-American endeavor is 
explored. 
E. THE REGIONAL CONTEXT 
1. The U.S. and Latin American Relationship 
The colorful historical relationship between the United States and its neighbors to 
the South is one of varying degrees of cooperation and covert military intervention.  It 
would be easy to claim that the strained relationship between the northern and southern 
American states has its roots in what is referred to as the Monroe Doctrine.  However, 
 
35 Nye, Jr., Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Succes in World Politics. (New York, NY: Public 
Affairs, 2004). x. 
36 Ibid, 7. 
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this broad accusation would be inaccurate, for the Monroe Doctrine sought to secure the 
sovereign rights of all states in the Western Hemisphere.  One might conclude that 
sovereignty was the bed rock of the doctrine that supported U.S. interests in the region.. 
Concerned about European intervention in the region, the Monroe Doctrine 
prepared in 1823 stated among other things that, “the American continents, by the free 
and independent condition which they have assumed, and maintain, are henceforth not to 
be considered subject to future colonization by any European powers.”37  This statement, 
along with the “Olvey fiat” of 1890s, that proclaimed U.S. sovereignty over all of Latin 
America, sought to legitimize U.S. interference in Latin America.  The full implications 
of these statements were clarified by President Theodore Roosevelt in 1904 who declared 
that Latin-American states must maintain democratic order outside of European influence 
otherwise the United States would intervene itself.  Known as the Roosevelt Corollary, 
this policy of U.S. intervention was applied in the Dominican Republic, Haiti, and 
Nicaragua.  Latin American states widely viewed the Monroe Doctrine as an expression 
of Yankee imperialism.38  The idea of American Imperialism would assume that 
Washington pursued most of its interests unilaterally; however, this was not the case.   
Atkins contends that, “the United States pursued many of its region-wide Latin American 
policies through the multilateral institutions of the Inter-American System.”39   
The Inter-American System was meant to encourage institutionalized, multilateral 
cooperation among the American states through multiple organizations for law, peace, 
security, and national well-being.  Collectively, these organizations became what are 
known as the Inter-American System of multilateral institutions in the 1920s.40  
Beginning in 1889, the Inter-American System developed seven organizational 
principles: (1) codification of international and inter-American law; (2) nonintervention 
and sovereign equality; (3) peace and security; (4) representative democracy and human 
 
37 Martin, Michael R. and Gabriel H. Lovett, Encyclopedia of Latin-American History, (New York: 
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1968), 222. 
38  Martin, Michael R. and Gabriel H. Lovett, Encyclopedia of Latin-American History. 
39 Atkins, G. Pope, Latin America and the Caribbean in the International System.  (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1999), 208. 
40 Ibid. 
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rights; (5) economic cooperation and development; (6) opposition to the drug traffic; and 
(7) environmental protection.41  The Inter-American System, as it is known today, 
principally consists of the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB), and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance 
regime. The roots of the Inter-American System are found within the Pan American 
movement. 
For Latin Americans, the Pan-American movement represented the ideals 
championed by Simon Bolivar, who helped liberate many Latin American countries from 
Spanish colonialism.  Established in 1890 and headquartered in Washington, the 
International Union of American States, also called the Pan American Union, created the 
multilateral foundation that the OAS would be built upon.  Critics may claim that the Pan 
American Union was just the first in a long line of organizations created by the United 
States to exert its influence in the hemisphere.  However, the original members of the 
PAU insisted on adopting a nonintervention theme to discourage unilateral action by any 
OAS member in hemispheric affairs.42 
The Cold War changed the way that the U.S. dealt with Latin America.  Fearful of 
the spread of Communism, Washington adopted an interventionist approach.  U.S. policy 
toward Latin America was characterized by an acceptance of authoritarian rule as long as 
it resisted Communism, even turning a blind eye toward human rights abuses.43  When 
the Cold War ended in 1991, Washington assumed a more aggressive posture toward 
fully democratizing the Western hemisphere that had begun in the 1980s.  Struggling 
governments were given enormous loans by U.S. banks that they could not repay.  In the 
ensuing financial crisis, strict monetary guidelines were imposed by the IMF that 
tightened the belts of almost all Latin Americans.  These struggling economies, coupled 
with rampant corruption, did nothing to support the growth of democracy in the region.  
 
41 Atkins, Latin American and the Caribbean, 222. 
42 William R. Slomanson, Fundamentals of International Law, Fifth Edition, (U.S.: Thomson / 
Wadsworth, 2007), 170. 
43 For an in-depth account on U.S. influence during the Cold War, see: James D. Cockcroft, Latin 
America: History, Politics, and U.S. Policy. (Chicago, IL: Nelson-Hall Publishers, 1998). 
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It was under these conditions in Venezuela that Hugo Chavez, the former military officer 
and failed coup leader, came to power in 1999. 
F. THE VENEZUELAN CONTEXT 
1. Understanding Chavismo and Venezuelan Democracy 
In 1999, Hugo Chavez won the presidency through enormous popular support, 
garnered through his nationalist, populist rhetoric that promised a ‘Bolivarian revolution’ 
that guaranteed to rewrite the Constitution and restructure state institutions while 
rejecting neo-liberalism.  Taking office in February 1999, he immediately began to make 
good on his promises for change.  In July 1999, the new 131 member Constituent 
Assembly was established, of which 121 were held by supporters of Chavez.  By 
November, the Constituent Assembly passed a new constitution.  The passing of the 
Bolivarian Constitution introduced radical changes to the institutional framework of the 
Venezuelan government.  The Constitution introduced a renewable six-year term for the 
President, replaced the bicameral legislature (which Chavez saw as inefficient and 
unproductive) with a 165-seat unicameral chamber (National Assembly), and abolished 
the Supreme Court in favor of a Supreme Tribunal of Justice.44  The democratic system 
of Venezuela had shed its representative coat in favor of a more direct style of 
democracy. 
The current democratic Bolivarian system of democracy that exists in Venezuela 
is viewed as a weaker version than that established by the Pact of Punto Fijo in 1958 by 
many observers.  The changes implemented by Chavez, under the auspices of the new 
National Assembly, serve his own agenda.  Hugo Chavez conved his succinct definition 
of democracy to Richard Gott in an interview for his book; “What has been called the 
democratic system in Venezuela has not differed much in recent years from what came 
before…Everything has basically remained the same; it’s been the same system of 
domination with a different face, whether it’s that of General Gomez or of Doctor Rafael 
 
44 West, Jacqueline ed. “Venezuela,” South America, Central America and the Caribbean 2005 13th 
ed. (NY: Europa Publications, 2005), 866. 
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Caldera.”45  Hugo Chavez knows what type of governance he wants and he has made 
great strides in proclaiming to the world those ambitions.  For him, the Bolivarian 
revolution is ongoing, requiring changes to all aspects of government including the role 
of the military. 
2. Civil Military Relations in Venezuela 
The role of the military and its relationship with President Chavez is especially 
important for understanding Venezuelan foreign policy.  It also highlights illuminates the 
criticism from Washington directed at Chavez’s regime.  Since 1999, Chavez has used 
the military to sustain his power by expanding the jurisdiction of the armed forces.46  
Consequently, the military has become pervasive in all aspects of politics; but this current 
influence of the military has not always been the case in Venezuela. 
From the advent of democracy in Venezuela in the 1960s, the military was 
developed, modernized and professionalized gradually over the next four decades.  Many 
considered Venezuelan democracy to be consolidated up until the attempted coup of 1992 
when disgruntled officers unhappy with government corruption and improprieties 
attempted to change the system.  Though Chavez and his Bolivarian Revolutionary 
movement were unsuccessful in 1992, their efforts sowed the seeds for success through 
more peaceful democratic means in 1998.47  Since Chavez has come to power, he has 
made great strides in blurring the lines between civilian and military roles.  Questions 
emerge concerning President Chavez’s overt politicization of the Armed Forces.  Is the 
fulfillment of traditional civilian roles by military officers an example of cronyism and 
appeasement; or are they a direct response to fears of international subversion?  
Alternatively, is it simply a by product of nationalistic Bolivarian democracy?  A brief 
explanation of the status of civil military relations provides a broader context within 
 
45 Chavez, Hugo.  Interview by Richard Gott, In the Shadow of the Liberator, 34. 
46 For an in-depth study into civil-military relations in Venezuela, see Harold A. Trinkunas, Crafting 
Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A comparative perspective (Chapel Hill, NC: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 2005). 
47 Canache, Damarys, “From Bullets to Ballots: The emergence of Popular Support for Hugo Chavez,” 
Latin American Politics and Society 44, no. 1 (Spring 2002). http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed November 22, 
2006). 
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which the reader can grasp the extent to which Chavez’s influence permeates Venezuelan 
government while undermining established democratic norms. 
In order to get a complete picture of the state of civil-military relations in 
Venezuela it is important to turn to the experts.  Harold Trinkunas provides a summary of 
Chavez’s agenda for the military in three stages: 1) Chavez has relied heavily on active 
and retired military officers to fill key cabinet positions and he has directly influenced 
officer promotions and assignments; 2) he reoriented military roles and missions from 
national defense to internal security and development; 3) and he provided a legal basis for 
military participation in civilian affairs through the new Bolivarian constitution of 
1999.48  All these measures, plus the new right to vote granted to soldiers in the 1999 
constitution, ensured increased politicization of the military.  Trinkunas explains this 
breakdown of institutional control of the military as a calculated step by Chavez; “The 
expanded jurisdiction of the armed forces is only a reflection of the elected leadership’s 
efforts to secure military support for its political agenda, rather than the result of an 
internal desire for role expansion by the officer corps.”49  The result of this institutional 
breakdown is the expansion of military influence across all four civil-military 
jurisdictional boundaries outlined by Trinkunas: external defense, internal security, 
public policy and state leadership.50  By blurring the boundaries between civilian and 
military roles in government, and strengthening ties with the military, Chavez’s control is 
strengthened overall.  This unbalanced level of power in favor of the executive is a key 
source of United States’ criticism of the Chavez regime. 
In essence, President Chavez has ensured military participation in virtually all 
aspects of government.  This decline in accepted boundaries for democratic civil-military 
relations appears not to be rooted in any Bolivarian ideals but rather an attempt by 
Chavez to build a safety net via the military.  This plan has seemed to backfire in regards 
to the events of 11 April 2002, when senior military leaders briefly deposed Chavez.  
However, civilian and military supporters were able to reinstate Chavez.  The point is that 
 
48 Trinkunas, Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela, 210. 
49 Ibid, 207. 
50 Ibid, 232. 
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Chavez has taken great measures to undermine democratic civil-military relations in 
Venezuela with no other goal than to secure his presidency and promote his control over 
the rest of the public administration.51  The decline of traditional democratic norms in 
Venezuela is important to understand, because it underscores the criticism by Washington 
of Chavez’s regime, fuelling the negative discourse between the two countries. 
3. The U.S. & Venezuelan Relationship 
So why focus on Venezuela?  The answer lies in the rich history between 
Venezuela and the United States and the dramatic change from tacit alliance to 
confrontation.  Once a guiding light for democracy in Latin America, Venezuela entered 
the twenty-first century starkly different from the one envisioned by the signers of the 
Pact of Punto Fijo in 1958.  The Pact of Punto Fijo was an agreement between the two 
dominant political parties in Venezuela and the military to ensure that democracy would 
be defended and authoritarianism eradicated.  Michael Coppedge noted that, “For the first 
two decades of the [democratic] regime, the prevailing attitude toward Venezuelan 
democracy was pride at home and admiration abroad.  …U.S. observers held up 
Venezuela as a democratic (and capitalist) model for the rest of Latin America…”52  At a 
time when Venezuelans could benefit from cooperation and assistance from the big 
power players in the region, the current leader, President Chavez, chose a different path; 
a path pioneered by the Venezuelan liberator, Simon Bolivar centuries before.  Steve 
Ellner notes, “Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez is the first elected Latin American 
head of state since Alan Garcia to defy the hegemonic powers of the ‘new world order.’  
He has been the only president throughout the continent to pursue a truly independent 
foreign policy and preach far-reaching changes at home.”53  President Chavez’s 
 
 
51 David Pion-Berlin, Harold Trinkunas, “Democratization, Social Crisis and the Impact of Military 
Domestic Roles in Latin America,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 33, no. 1 (Summer 
2005),17. 
52 Coppedge, Michael.  “Partidocracia and Reform in Comparative Perspective,” in Jennifer McCoy, 
Andres Serbin, William C. Smith and Andres Stambouli, eds., Venezuelan Democracy Under Stress. 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1995). p.174. 
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performance since he took office in 1999 has been colored by fiery rhetoric pointed at the 
hegemonic power in the hemisphere that elucidates his Bolivarian revolution for the 
country and the region. 
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Chavez’s rhetoric has further 
removed him from the good graces of the hemisphere’s hegemonic power.  Shortly after 
the United States commenced offensive operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan, Chavez went on record as condemning the actions.  The Venezuelan 
government refused to join in the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) despite the 
commitment of it neighbors in the Organization of American States (OAS).  The lack of 
commitment to the GWOT continued in 2003 when Chavez denounced the U.S. led 
Coalition invasion of Iraq.  Further fractious measures taken by Chavez include ending 
all cooperative programs with the U.S. military in April 2005; ending cooperation with 
the Drug Enforcement Agency in July 2005; and openly supporting Iran’s defense of its 
nuclear program.54  These actions garnered ire in Washington and enticed mutual hostile 
rhetoric from the Bush administration.  Chavez was condemned by Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice as a “negative force” in the region and labeled a “troublemaker” by 
Donald Rumsfeld.55  Relations between the two nations continue to spiral downward 
despite their mutual reliance on oil exports and imports that bind their economies.  In a 
recent address to the United Nations, President Chavez gave a fiery rebuke directed at the 
Bush administration, stating, “The government of the United States doesn’t want peace.  
It wants to exploit its system of exploitation, of pillage, of hegemony through war.”56  
President Chavez certainly perceives the United States as a threat. 
Hugo Chavez has taken strides regionally and internationally to utilize the soft 
means that have been defined in this thesis.  He has repeatedly lobbied for an increased 
 
53 Ellner, Steve, “The ‘Radical’ Thesis on Globalization and the Case of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez,” 
Latin American Perspectives 29, no.6 (2002):88, http://www.jstor.org/ (accessed October 27, 2006). 
 54 Jane’s Defence Intelligence Centres, “Venezuela: External Affairs,” http://jmsa.janes.com/ 
(accessed on 30 November 2006). 
55 Ibid. 
56 President Hugo Chavez’s (Venezuela) address to the United Nations, September 20, 2006, 
http://www.commondreams.org/ (accessed 29 November 2006). 
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role in the United Nations, especially the Security Council; he has taken on a leadership 
role in OPEC; he has sought a leadership role in the OAS and Mercosur; and he has 
challenged U.S. hegemony from the podium at the United Nations.  Furthermore, Chavez 
has denied over-flight privileges to the U.S. utilized to combat drug trafficking in the 
region.  While none of these moves directly challenges U.S. military power, they do bring 
into question the policy initiatives of the United States.  In these terms, it is apparent that 
Chavez has attempted to balance power in the hemisphere via soft means.  Perhaps the 
ultimate question remains how effective these tactics will prove. 
G. CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This first chapter presented four propositions.  First, the world order is perceived 
as unipolar and the U.S. as the leading pole.  Second, U.S. unilateralist polices, such as 
military preemption, have threatened to destabilize the international system.  Third, third-
tier states that do not conform to U.S. ideals are threatened by U.S. preponderance and 
will seek to secure their sovereignty and interests.  Finally, because small states do not 
possess the resources to traditionally balance power through military means, they will 
utilize soft balancing tactics and cultivate soft power in the international system.  
Additionally, this chapter posited that that President Hugo Chavez is not just another 
Latin American “caudillo;” rather, he represents a charismatic leader of a “third-tier” 
country who feels threatened by U.S. hegemony and is taking action to mitigate this 
threat  The following chapters seek to develop these four propositions in order to answer 
the thesis question, how do small states challenge United States’ preponderance in the 
international system? 
The second chapter lays the foundation for understanding Hugo Chavez, his 
evolution from a poor Venezuelan, his education in the military, revolutionary 
motivations, and finally his assent to the Presidency.  Understanding the man behind the 
rhetoric is imperative to understanding the motivating ideology for his Bolivarian 
Revolution for Venezuela, his threat perceptions, and the methods he uses to achieve his 
goals.  The chapter furthers the discussion that President Hugo Chavez is not just another 
Latin American “caudillo.” 
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 The third chapter develops the concept of soft balancing by small states.  
Continuing the Venezuelan case study, chapter three analyzes Hugo Chavez’s use of the 
nonmilitary tools of soft balancing – international institutions, economic statecraft, and 
diplomatic arrangements – as defined by T.V. Paul and Robert Pape.  Each of these soft 
balancing tools is explored with regards to Chavez’s challenge to U.S. preponderance in 
the international system. 
The fourth chapter assesses whether third-tier states are capable of leveraging soft 
power within a broader soft balancing strategy.  Utilizing the properties of soft power as 
illustrated by Joseph Nye, this chapter evaluates third-tier soft power capabilities in 
regards to agenda setting efforts, powers of attraction, and co-option efforts.  In order to 
accomplish this task, it must be determined whether third-tier states are able to influence 
the preferences of others.  Again, Venezuela under the Chavez regime is utilized as the 
case study.  
The concluding chapter presents final thoughts on the role of small states in a 
unipolar system, and implications, if any, for U.S. foreign policy.  The final chapter 
asserts that engagement by the United States with small states is more important than 
ever under a unipolar system where U.S. preponderance appears threatening.  In turn, this 
will require a reversal of trends in U.S. policy.  Before these issues are addressed, 
understanding the political leader of one such small power by exploring his ideological 
foundations is essential to the broader discussion. 
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II.  HUGO CHAVEZ IN CONTEXT 
A. INTRODUCTION 
A key component of soft power ideology, especially when shared among many 
actors, and in turn these actors seek to cooperate in spreading this ideology.  For the 
United States, ideas of democracy and freedom are key aspects of its soft power, and as 
such, many countries are attracted to it.  For Hugo Chavez, his self-proclaimed ideology 
revolves around Bolivarian Socialism and general anti-American sentiment. As the last 
chapter showed, because of the nature of Venezuela’s political system, its leaders’ views 
are especially important.  The focus of this chapter is to reveal the factors that have led 
Hugo Chavez to Bolivarian Socialism and to pursue a foreign policy defiant of American 
expectations; one that attempts to utilize soft power in a larger soft balancing strategy.  In 
addition, power in the current Venezuelan regime is concentrated in the executive, 
making understanding the president’s ideas and actions more important than ever.  Thus, 
this chapter is designed to reveal the sources of the Bolivarian ideology, as interpreted by 
Chavez, and its implications for Venezuelan soft power.   
To accomplish this task, the chapter explores the man and his political ideals.  
Additionally, knowing how Chavez’s threat perceptions have come into being is 
imperative to understanding his challenge to United States’ preponderance in the 
international system.  Understanding his ideological roots and threat perceptions, and 
how these in turn dictate his foreign policy for Venezuela, underscores the urgency of the 
research, because they directly impact Venezuela’s relationship with the United States. 
B. THE EVOLUTION OF HUGO CHAVEZ 
In their definitive biography of Hugo Chavez, Cristina Marcano and Alberto 
Tyszka note that “Washington has always tended to misread Latin America, and Hugo 
Chavez is no exception, for he is a rare specimen who eludes easy categorization.”57  
 
57 Marcano, Cristina, and Alberto Barrera Tyska. Hugo Chavez: The Definitive Biography of 
Venezuela’s Controversial President. (NY: Random House, 2007), 204. 
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Chavez has been labeled everything from a revolutionary communist to a charismatic 
caudillo.  Regardless of any typology, Chavez has made his mark in the region as a 
supporter of socialism.  Therefore, an exploration of his rise from a mid-level military 
officer to the leader of the country is essential in understanding how Venezuela, once a 
model for democratic consolidation and economic success in the 1960s, finds its 
democratic foundations eroding.  When did Chavez’s political aspirations emerge?  What 
political agenda did he seek to fulfill?  These questions of motivation and inspiration all 
deserve their turn. 
Many characterizations of Chavez have been put forth since 1998, when Chavez 
appeared as a serious contender in the presidential elections.  Former President of Brazil 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso offers a very perceptive view of Chavez that has been 
cultivated from years of personal interaction with the man: 
Chavez is in essence the reincarnation of the old caudillo.  He is populist 
and salvationist.  In this sense, he is very different from Lula [the current 
Brazilian President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva].  Lula is not interested in 
saving the world…[and] Lula has no revolutionary agenda for Brazil or 
the world.  Chavez, in contrast, does have a revolutionary agenda.  The 
problem is that he does not exactly know what it is.  It exists only as a 
slogan called bolivarianism, which means nothing and serves only as a 
base to throw Venezuela’s future out the window.58 
 
Cardozo presents a pessimistic view of Chavez’s agenda for Venezuela, which may not 
be altogether incorrect, but what is important for this study – not only for democracy and 
civil-military relations in the country, but its impact on foreign policy – is understanding 
why Chavez is a revolutionary caudillo.  Where Chavez developed such aspirations is the 
subject of the next sections. 
1. Childhood Socialist Influences 
Hugo Chavez Frias was born the son of a rural schoolteacher on 28 July 1954, in 
the small town of Sabaneta in western Venezuela.  Notably, the Chavez family has a 
 
58 Paul Sotereo quoting from an interview with former President Cardozo in Max G. Manwaring, 
Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymetric Warfare.  U.S. Army War College: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 2005, 7. 
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legacy of political involvement.  Several branches of the family tree include legendary 
military leaders who rose up against oppressive regimes and landed oligarchies during the 
nineteenth century.  Some of the most famous are Colonel Pedro Perez Perez, a guerrilla 
leader in 1840, and General Pedro Perez Delgado who fought to remove the dictatorship 
of General Juan Vicente Gomez in 1914.59  Chavez appears to have been born into a 
family of freedom fighters whose legacy stopped short with his parents.  While being 
raised by his grandmother, Chavez came into contact with leftist figures that would have 
an important impact on his life.  
As a young impressionable adolescent, Chavez listened daily to the teachings of 
“an old-school Communist,” named José Esteban Ruiz Guevara.60  Under Ruiz 
Guevara’s communist tutelage, Chavez was exposed to many of fundamental readings, 
such as Jean Jacques Rousseau’s The Social Contract, Machiavelli’s The Prince, and the 
readings of Karl Marx.61  Ruiz Guevara also insisted that Chavez, along with his two 
sons, be intimately familiar with Venezuelan history; making sure that he appreciated the 
role and importance of such figures as Ezequiel Zamora and Simon Bolivar.  In their 
biography of Chavez, Marcano and Tyska note that “the Ruiz house became the magnetic 
center and intellectual reference point of his adolescence.  He devoured all kinds of 
books, from westerns to things like Los conceptos elementales del materialismo histórico 
(The Elemental Concepts of Historical Materialism).62  Though these influential 
communist influences did not entice Chavez to begin his military career as a Communist 
agent or foment a communist revolution – his true intentions were to continue his dream 
of playing baseball while escaping the impoverished countryside – they certainly laid the 
groundwork of his ideological foundation.63 
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2. The Military Man 
In 1971 at the age of 17, Hugo Chavez entered the military academy in the capital 
city of Caracas.  At that time, Rafael Caldera was president of Venezuela, serving his first 
of two nonconsecutive terms; as luck would have it, Chavez would succeed him in 1999.  
In the academy, Chavez studied hard, learning more about the heroes of Venezuela’s 
history.  He came to idealize Simon Bolivar, the nineteenth century liberator of Latin 
America.  The academy served to reinforce these ideals; students “developed an almost 
mythical attachment to the teachings of Bolivar, and many shared a populist, egalitarian, 
and ultimately utilitarian attitude toward democracy.”64  Bolivar’s dream of a united 
South America took seed in Chavez after a trip to Peru where he participated in an 
international celebration of the 150th anniversary of the battle of Ayacucho 
commemorating the liberation of Peru from Spain.  In 1975, President Carlos Perez 
commissioned the young Chavez; handing him his sword at graduation from the military 
academy.65  Ironically, a more knowledgeable and leftist Chavez would attempt to oust 
President Perez some sixteen years later.   
Chavez’s first duty station was in Barinas, where he was assigned to a counter-
insurgency battalion charged with eliminating the communist left wing guerrillas known 
as Bandera Roja (Red Flag).66  It was at this early stage in his military career fighting the 
radical left that Chavez began to take notice of the increasing levels of corruption 
rampant in both political and military ranks.  In 1977, at the young age of 23 with only 
two years of military experience, Chavez began his leftist journey by forming his own 
armed group within the military.  He called the movement Ejercito de Liberacion del 
Pueblo de Venezuela (ELPV), Liberation Army of the Venezuelan People.  Their motives 
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were self-proclaimed simple. Chavez, in regards to this early effort, is quoted as saying, 
“It was very simple.  We did it to prepare ourselves in case something should 
happen…we hadn’t the least idea at that time what we were going to do.”67  Despite its 
simplicity, this early ‘Bolivarian’ endeavor served as a building block for a more 
effective movement.  In 1978, despair over governmental corruption was increasing; 
however, Chavez remained in the military and was assigned to a tank battalion in 
Maracay, a city to the southwest of Caracas.   
It was in 1980, after being assigned to the military academy in Caracas, that 
Chavez got his opportunity to cultivate his socialist ideology and he does so with the 
young malleable minds of the cadet corp.  Chavez began to build the foundation of his 
socialist movement to challenge the government with the cadets at the academy.  He 
knew that he would need the backing from the military leadership. The young cadets, 
many who come from outside the city and had become disenchanted with what 
democracy had to offer, soon welcomed Chavez, who quickly displayed a talent for 
teaching and public speaking.68  All that was left was to formulate an organized and 
legitimate movement that stood for those values promoted by Simon Bolivar and which 
his ancestors had fought for in the1800s and early 1900s.   
3. Foundations of the Bolivarian Revolution 
In 1982, Chavez and a cadre of politically progressive officers formed a political 
cell within the Venezuelan Army known as the Ejercito Bolivariano Revolucionario, 
Bolivarian Revolutionary Army (EBR-200), also known later as the Movimiento 
Bolivariano Revolucionario – 200 (MBR-200), the Bolivarian Revolutionary 
Movement.69  This organization carried on the ideals of the original ELPV movement 
founded by the young lieutenant Chavez; but this time, the goals and objectives of the 
movement were well defined.  These rebels represented a growing nationalist faction of 
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junior officers that were highly critical of the Punto Fijo system created in the 1958 Pact 
that had ushered in democracy.70  Harold Trinkunas attributes the ability of the junior 
officers to form factions within the ranks without or in spite of the knowledge of senior 
officers to institutions designed by President Perez to create cleavages across the officer 
corp.  While this served to inhibit coups d’etat, they served to distance the senior high 
command from junior and mid level officers whose discontents were serving to bond 
them in an organized movement.71  
By 1992, the membership of the MBR-200 reportedly totaled 10 percent of all 
army officers.  While the movement was most certainly spearheaded by the military, 
Chavez understood the need for civilian participation within the movement and 
encouraged MBR-200 to conspire actively with other Venezuelan revolutionary 
commandants in order to build a “civilian-military insurgency.”  These coconspirators 
included Douglas Bravo, the renowned guerilla leader of the Partido de la Revolucion 
Venezolana.  This decision to include civilians in the movement proved disastrous for the 
attempted coup in 1992.  Nevertheless, Chavez’s decision to include civilian actors points 
to the depth of his understanding of Venezuelan society.  Chavez had studied the military 
revolution in Peru in the 1970s and knew that in order to garner the support and trust of 
the population and legitimize the MBR-200, the movement could not be solely a military 
undertaking.72   
Chavez and the MBR-200 continue to build their socialist movement for nearly a 
decade by recruiting within the military and garnering limited civilian support throughout 
the country.  Certain prerequisites were required before they could make a move against 
President Perez all the pieces had to be in place.  Underpinning the whole operation was 
the need for Chavez and his comrades to be placed in charge of substantial combat forces.  
These operational and societal conditions finally developed in 1991. 
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4. 1992 Coup Attempt 
Lieutenant Colonel Chavez was assigned as the commander of a parachute 
regiment based at Maracay in 1991.  His assignment along with several co-conspirators 
stationed at key bases throughout Venezuela felled the final hurdle in the plans for the 
eventual coup; Chavez was now in charge of a combat unit.  The political conditions 
were ripe for conflict.  Venezuelan democracy was treading water amidst serious political 
and military instability during the months leading up to the failed coups.73 Michael 
Coppedge argues that Venezuela’s parties, specifically the Democratic Action (Accion 
Democratica, AD) and the Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cristiano de Venezuela, 
COPEI), misused Venezuela’s democratic institutions and this misuse served to 
undermine democratic legitimacy in Venezuela.  The party system in Venezuela during 
Chavez’s rise through the ranks began to lose contact with the people, seeking to fulfill 
their own aspirations rather than working for the electorate.  Political reform was 
imperative, but as Coppedge notes, “As many countries have discovered in the past, 
reforms often do more harm than good.”74  With this sentiment in mind, the Venezuelan 
government was ill prepared to handle the growing unrest.  Chavez and his Bolivarian 
brothers favored drastic measures for reform and were waiting for the chance to 
capitalize on the right moment.  Felipe Aguero emphasizes this discontent within the 
armed forces, in his work on civil-military relations in Venezuela.  He contends, “The 
military rebellions of 1992 were a reflection of the impact on the armed forces of the 
deterioration of civil institutions, as well as the erosion of a specific crisis with in the 
armed forces.”75  The crisis would come to a head on February 4, 1992. 
Just after midnight on the February 4, LTC Chavez set in motion the ill-fated 
events that he had anticipated for nearly a decade.  Units were set to attack the defense 
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ministry, the airport inside the city and the Miraflores Palace, while LTC Chavez would 
set up a command and control site at the Military History Museum near the palace.  
Despite all their attempts at secrecy, the mission was doomed to failure when a defense 
ministry official suspicious of recent rumors floating through the ranks of an imminent 
coup attempt, warned President Perez before he could be captured at the airfield.76  
Additionally, the civilian component of the coup failed to show up.  With the element of 
surprise gone, lack of civilian reinforcements, and Chavez’s inability to set up command 
and control, the coup attempt was doomed.   
However, it was through this ill-fated attempt that Hugo Chavez became a 
national hero.  In an effort to save his comrades positioned throughout the country, 
Chavez was allowed to go on national television and appeal for their surrender.  In doing 
so, he provided a face for the movement and showed a rational and humane side to the 
military’s efforts.  Venezuela’s crisis was now exposed to the world and the government 
was forced to deal with the issues that pushed the military to such extreme measures.  
Eventually, Congress impeached President Perez in May 1993 under allegations of 
corruption and Rafael Caldera was elected the following January.  In regards to the coup 
attempt, Caldera saw fit to blame the regime of President Perez in his opening speech: 
A military coup, whatever form it takes, must be censured and 
condemned; yet it would be naïve to think that this was an event in which 
a handful of ambitious men threw themselves rashly into adventure, on 
their account, without being aware of the wider implications of their 
action.  There was a set of circumstances here, a backcloth to these 
developments, which is the serious situation in which the country finds 
itself.  If this situation is not dealt with, the future may yet hold unpleasant 
surprises for us all.77 
  
In essence, Caldera let the military off the hook with this statement (and the subsequent 
pardoning of the coup instigators in 1995) by not condoning their actions but not faulting 
them altogether.  This sympathetic attitude toward the participants of the coup served to 
legitimize their cause and decriminalize their actions.  Though the coup was 
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unsuccessful, Chavez would come to capitalize on the popular support that emerged in 
the aftermath of these events to ascend to the presidency in 1999. 
5. Ascendancy to the Presidency 
In February 1999, Hugo Chavez, the retired lieutenant colonel who led an 
unsuccessful military coup seven years earlier, stood in front of the Venezuelan Congress 
as the legitimately elected president of one of South America’s oldest democracies.78  
The participation of ex-military men in electoral politics is nothing new to democracy in 
the United States, as George Washington, Eisenhower, and other’s military service 
demonstrate.  Likewise, Latin America has witnessed ex-military men vie for and win the 
presidency of democratic governments.  For instance, Hugo Banzer, the ex-dictator of 
Bolivia (1971-78), won the presidency in 1997; General Jaime Salinas Sedo, who led an 
unsuccessful coup in Peru at the same time as Chavez, ran for the presidency in 2000.79  
However, there is no precedent for the election of a failed coup leader within a country 
that values democracy above all other forms of government.80   
The electoral victory of Chavez was the result of a convergence of factors that 
existed in Venezuela throughout the 1990s.  These factors include the deterioration of 
living standards, the perception of generalized political corruption, the decay of 
traditional parties, the construction of electoral alliances, and a dynamic electoral 
campaign.81  Damarys Canache contends that these factors are not enough to explain why 
Venezuelans entrusted democratic governance to a man who had once attempted to 
overthrow the nation’s democratic regime.82  She proposes two hypotheses to explain 
how Chavez successfully built popular support from 1992 to 1998.  First, Chavez 
successfully mobilized those Venezuelans who were democratically ambivalent due 
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largely to the negative factors prevalent throughout the country.  Second, Chavez 
appealed to the majority of Venezuelans who still favored democracy by convincing them 
that he no longer was a threat to democracy.  Through these efforts, Canache contends, 
“Chavez accomplished with ballots what he could not do with bullets.”83  However, 
Chavez’s political achievements via his own efforts and those of the transformed MBR-
200, do not account fully for his success.   
Another argument explaining Chavez’s success in 1998 is rooted in events that 
occurred decades earlier.  In his piece, “Federalism and Institutional Change in 
Venezuela,” Michael Penfold-Becerra argues that Chavez’s grand rise to the presidency 
was in essence achieved through the activation in 1989 of the federal framework within 
the 1961 constitution via its decentralizing pressure on political parties.84  Penfold-
Becerra’s piece centers on the decentralization of the government via federalism.85  By 
activating the federal system in 1989, governors were no longer appointed by the 
executive; additionally the mayoral position was created.  All these measures activated 
the dormant federal system found within the Constitution; consequentially decentralizing 
the government.  With increased public disdain for the party system that came to bear in 
the failed 1992 coup, governors began to focus on the demands of the voters and not the 
party line.  Penfold-Becerra illustrates in the case of Venezuela that federalism 
emphasizes key political dynamics between national, regional, and local political actors.  
The key dynamics of nonconcurrent elections for sub-national actors and the new 
reelection rules shocked the traditional relationships in the party system.  Eventually, 
federalism was too much for the parties to handle and their ultimate fragmentation led to 
the victory of Chavez and the MVR in 1999. 
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Understanding how Hugo Chavez came to power is instrumental in understanding 
the greater implications for democracy in Venezuela.  Chavez came to power amidst 
economic and political turmoil.  Two of the strongest political parties in Latin America 
were crumbling, unable to garner any leverage against the quickly rising MVR due in 
part to their inability to decisively back anyone candidate.  Furthermore, the people of 
Venezuela were fed up with what they saw as rampant corruption among the leadership 
while the population suffered the consequences of poor economic policy.  In light of the 
social unrest and turmoil running throughout Venezuela, Canache reveals the underlying 
uncertainty behind Venezuela’s democratic future; she notes, “What remains in question 
is whether [Chavez] turned to ballots because he truly has embraced democratic 
governance, or only because ballots represented his best hope to acquire power.”86 The 
focus now turns to democratic governance and the implications for democracy in 
Venezuela under the Chavez regime. 
C. EVOLVING THREAT PERCEPTIONS  
The focus thus far in the chapter has been twofold; to understand the emergence 
of Hugo Chavez from failed coup leader to president, and to uncover how his Bolivarian 
ideology was developed and then implemented.  Vital to the discussion of challenging 
U.S. preponderance is discussing why it is viewed as threatening.  Thus, the focus now 
turns to the threat perceptions of President Chavez after he assumed office.  Hugo Chavez 
clearly views United States hegemony in the region and subsequently the world as a 
threat to his government, openly stating this fact in many venues.  Study of the current 
literature finds that Chavez perceives external threats to the sovereignty of Venezuela and 
Latin American states as a region in the past and present U.S. foreign policy.   
As stated in the first chapter, U.S. foreign policy appears to be increasingly 
unilateral.  Notably, unilateral policy has disadvantages intrinsic to its definition, 
primarily concerning the issue of legitimacy.  Unilateral initiatives in Latin America can 
be easily construed as self-serving.  In light of these facts, U.S. policy toward Venezuela 
has been focused on removing this stigma while still serving it interests in the hemisphere 
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through a two-prong strategy to increase support to civil groups in Venezuela and to 
convince other countries that Chavez should be viewed as a troublemaker in the region.87  
While appearing to be multilateral in policy initiatives concerning its own hemisphere, 
the United States took extensive unilateral steps to topple Saddam Hussein’s regime in 
Iraq in 2003, a small state that fits well in the third tier.  This section attempts to shed 
light on Chavez’s threat perceptions by looking at U.S. democratic aid efforts in 
Venezuela, its response to the brief 2002 coup, and its policy of preemption and 
preventive war. 
1. Democratic Aid Efforts 
Washington provides millions of dollars of taxpayers’ money to organizations that 
provide consultation on developing and strengthening democratic institutions throughout 
the world.  These U.S. funded democracy projects include the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED), Economic Support Funds (ESF), and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID).88 Latin America has been a recipient of this 
congressionally funded aid for decades and Venezuela is no exception.  The NED has 
operated in Venezuela since 1992, most recently providing $902,000 for sixteen 
democracy projects.89  Likewise, USAID, through its Office of Transition Initiatives, has 
provided over $9 million through FY2005 and FY2006.  The goals of both organizations 
are very similar; to strengthen democratic institutions, promoting space for dialogue, and 
encouraging citizens’ participation in democratic processes.90  However, since Hugo 
Chavez’s assumption of command, United States’ aid efforts have come under intense 
scrutiny amid allegations of meddling in Venezuela’s democratic process and attempting 
to subvert the democratically elected leader.  Chavez’s distrust of democratic aid is 
echoed by Carlos Escarra, a constitutional lawyer and a leading legislator in the National 
Assembly, in a recent article in The New York Times, “Washington thinks it can buy 
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regime change in Venezuela.  This is an affront to our sovereignty as a nation that is not 
docile to Washington’s interests.”91   
Critics of U.S. intervention in Venezuela abound; within the United States, none 
may be as vocal and critical as Eva Golinger, a Venezuelan-American attorney, and a 
specialist in international human rights and immigration law.  Using hundreds of 
document obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), Golinger depicts 
how the U.S. government has attempted to overthrow the Chavez government since he 
took power.92  Using historical precedents of CIA intervention in Iran, Guatemala, the 
Congo, Cuba, and Brazil, Golinger concludes that the NED is nothing more than a front 
for CIA activity.  While this may scream of conspiracy theory, NED’s problematic role is 
self-acknowledged. 
In June 2006, the NED released a report for the Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations titled The Backlash Against Democracy Assistance.93  The title of the report is 
easily mistaken as an attempt to address the reasons for the “backlash” when in reality it 
only offers new efforts to press on in the face of increasing opposition.  The focus is on 
“foreign government’s efforts to impede democracy assistance – from legal constraints 
on NGOs to extra-legal forms of harassment,” and how increased funding and positive 
spin can mitigate these impediments.  Additionally, the US intervention in Iraq, largely 
viewed as illegitimate world wide, has emboldened those who criticize the concept of 
democracy promotion.  In an article for the Financial Times, Thomas Carothers, head of 
democracy projects at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, stated, “The US 
must not confuse regime change with democracy promotion activities otherwise NGOs 
associated with, or funded by, the US would be contaminated.”94  This statement rings 
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true for the events in 2002, when US involvement with the coup was perceived by 
Venezuelans to be connected to democracy promotion efforts. 
2. 2002 Coup Attempt  
Many of President Chavez’s threat perceptions may be attributed to the events 
that transpired on 11 April 2002.  Relations between the senior military leaders and 
Chavez’s administration had begun to deteriorate prior to 2002.  Opponents of Chavez 
claimed he was seeking to install a Cuban-style communist regime in Venezuela.95  The 
protests that emerged in the country in late 2001 and into 2002 led to general strikes 
throughout Venezuela; the increasing unrest in the country destabilized Chavez’s hold on 
key institutions and he was unable to stop the spreading violence.96  On the morning of 
the 12th, General Lucas Rincon Romero, the chief of the armed forces, announced on 
national television that Chavez had resigned at the request of the senior military leaders.  
However, the coup lasted only two days when the junta collapsed following a revolt by 
the presidential guard and mass popular demonstrations calling for the return of the 
democratically elected President.97 
The break with the constitutional order in Venezuela was widely condemned by 
the international community, with the exception of Washington.98  In reference to 
Washington’s response to and involvement in the attempted coup, Carlos Romero states: 
“[the] measured reaction to those calamitous events suggests that Washington viewed 
relations with Caracas as too important to allow provocateurs of any persuasion to force 
precipitous intervention into Venezuela’s internal political quarrels.”99  Despite the fact 
that the coup was led by the military and the rampant corruption that indicted President 
Perez, Washington’s reaction to the coup in 2002 starkly contrasted its reaction to the 
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coups led by the military in 1992.  It is noted that in 1992, “U.S. Ambassador Michael 
Skol and his superiors in Washington announced their support for democracy and the 
Perez administration and threatened drastic sanctions against any military regime that 
took power in Venezuela.”100  In 2002, it was the nations in Latin America that united in 
condemning the removal of a democratically elected president by other than official 
means.  Beyond the many conspiracy theories concerning United States’ involvement in 
the actual coup, Washington’s relative muteness and subtle support of the opposition 
have led many to perceive official backing by the United States.101  This perception was 
certainly not lost on Chavez, the consequences of which would be dire for relations 
between the two countries.   
As the flow of American money to support democratic aid in Venezuela 
continued to increase after the 2002 coup, the threat perceptions of Chavez increased.  
The issue of democratic aid and sovereignty remain a point of contention between the 
two governments.  In an article in the New York Times, Carlos Escarra, a constitutional 
lawyer and a leading legislator in the National Assembly emphasized the negative 
perceptions surrounding democratic aid; “Washington thinks it can buy regime change in 
Venezuela.  This is an affront to our sovereignty as a nation that is not docile to 
Washington’s interests.”102  These types of sentiments serve only to feed the threat 
perceptions of Chavez, whether they are justified or not. 
3. Preventive War and Preemption 
The shift after September 11, 2001, in United States’ policy on the use of hostile 
force must be considered when talking about small state threat perceptions.  Prior to the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, U.S. defense policy was geared more toward 
deterrence.  The strength and force projection capability of the military, funded and 
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developed during the Cold War was a deterrent to hostile actors, specifically state actors.  
However, after the terrible experience on 9/11, the U.S. government seems to have 
adopted the policy of preemption and preventive war and discarded the doctrine of 
deterrence.103  The invasion of Iraq clearly demonstrated the Bush administration’s intent 
to take the fight to regimes hostile to the U.S., even before the aggressor openly 
demonstrated hostilities.104   
The obvious affront to national sovereignty implicit to preemptive war policy can 
not be lost on President Chavez.  One might even argue that preemptive war is not unique 
to the twenty-first century.  Historical precedent exists to bolster Chavez’s fears closer to 
home, especially in light of his burgeoning friendship with Fidel Castro.  In April 1961, a 
group of some 1,500 Cuban exiles, recruited and trained by the CIA and Department of 
Defense, attempted an unsuccessful amphibious assault of Cuba.105  The ill-fated Bay of 
Pigs and subsequent operations aimed at overthrowing Fidel Castro reinforce Chavez’s 
fears that the United States will intervene militarily when Washington is at odds with 
certain regimes.  The CIA involvement in Cuba and the rumored involvement in the 2002 
coup further his fears of impending U.S. action.  Further overt displays of military 
hegemony are found in U.S. military action in Panama, Nicaragua, and its continued 
presence in Columbia.  President Chavez’s fears of preemption by Washington, to 
preserve its hegemony and economic interests in the hemisphere, are evident in his 
September 2006, speech to the United Nations when he proclaimed: “The hegemonic 
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species…the American empire is doing all it can to consolidate its system of 
domination.”106  When it comes to threat perceptions, statements like these leave little 
doubt of their origin. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Threat perceptions guide policy.  The truth behind this statement is evident in the 
actions of the Bush administration in regards to Iraq.  The perceived threat of weapons of 
mass destruction, one that has yet to be justified, proved strong enough to warrant a 
devastating preemptive war.  In light of this, is it that far fetched to suppose that the 
threat perceptions of a second tier country, like Venezuela, would provide enough 
impetus to challenge the leading power in the hemisphere – non-militarily?  Ellner points 
out that Chavez is convinced, along with many of his military supporters, “that with the 
end of the cold war, Washington would prefer to phase out the Latin American armed 
forces or convert them into police forces in charge of combating crime and keeping 
public order.”107  These fears of deteriorating sovereignty may be fed by globalization, 
and the coercive foreign policy of Washington.  Unfortunately for Chavez, the world 
economy is becoming increasingly global while privatization of international companies 
– such as oil and power – continues to prove folly.  Furthermore, U.S. military hegemony 
will most likely stay the same for the fore seeable future.  That leaves the only possible 
avenue of reconciliation within the realm of foreign policy.  If Washington remains 
steadfast in condemning Chavez’s regime as illegitimate and nondemocratic while 
funneling millions into democratic program viewed by Chavez as clear threats to national 
sovereignty, they risk losing all access to the country. 
If threat perceptions do guide policy, then what guides the threat perceptions?  
This chapter has proposed three variables that act on these perceptions: Chavez’s political 
development and understanding of Bolivarian socialism, a legacy of corruption under a 
democratic regime, and U.S. foreign policy toward Latin America and other small 
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powers.  In relation to democracy, Bolivarian socialism and the unraveling of democracy 
leading up to the election in 1999 appears too have been sufficient in undermining the 
democratic system and institutions.  The undermining of civil-military affairs does not 
appear directly related to any factor other than Chavez’s own attempts securing a support 
base.  The remaining three international variables appear to push Chavez into deepening 
his Bolivarian revolution.  U.S. policy has given him the fodder for his anti-American 
rhetoric that seeks to convince Venezuelans that his version of democracy is the right 
one.  So what does this mean for Venezuela’s future? 
In an article for Foreign Affairs, Kurt Weyland conveys a cynical view of 
Venezuela’s future: “However long Chavez’s populist experiment may end up lasting, it 
will take the country many years to recover from this disastrous experience.”108  As it 
stands today, Chavez’s “populist experiment” will last another six years and possibly 
longer if he succeeds in removing all term limits for presidential re-election.  After 
winning the December 3 election with an astounding 64% of the vote, Chavez declared 
that he would “deepen and extend the revolution,” the endstate being “21st century 
socialism.”109  Chavez has taken measures to further his socialist vision by placing 
controls on prices, access to foreign exchange and the allocation of bank credit; and 
because the opposition boycotted the legislative election last year, he continues to control 
all branches of government.110  The future for democracy looks grim which appears tied 
in part to Venezuela’s main source of revenue – oil-exports.  Hector E. Schamis furthers 
this viewpoint in his piece for the Journal of Democracy, “Chavez’s rule represents an oil 
funded, twenty-first century version of patrimonial domination.  Along with the vague 
populist oratory and nebulous socialist goals come clearly undemocratic methods.”111  Is 
it simply the petro-state that engenders a patrimonial system of domination like Chavez’s 
Venezuela?  The international factors introduced in this section provide another piece to 
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the puzzle that is Chavez’s stubborn hold on Venezuela.  The next chapter evaluates 
Chavez’s Bolivarian foreign policy in terms of soft balancing. 
 42
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 43
                                                
III. SOFT BALANCING: CHAVEZ’S CROSS CULTURAL 
CHALLENGE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
As stated in the first chapter, traditional hard balancing measures to counter 
preponderant power are not an option for small states like Venezuela.  No matter how 
many refurbished Russian submarines, aircraft, or Kalashnikov rifles Chavez purchases, 
he cannot hope to thwart American interests in the region militarily.  Neither is Chavez 
likely to form a coalition robust enough militarily to effectively challenge the United 
States outright.  However, outside the realm of traditional hard balancing measures small 
states like Venezuela can use “softer” strategies to infringe on the foreign policy interests 
of the hegemon.  The first “soft means” of challenging the United State’s preponderance 
discussed in this thesis is the strategy of soft balancing. 
1. The Logic of Soft Balancing and Alliance Building 
In essence, the logic of soft balancing stems from the logic of alliance building.  
The common thread is the need for security in a threatening environment.  Two scholars 
of international politics writing during the Cold War period, Kenneth Waltz and Stephen 
Walt, illuminated the incentives for alliance formation – primarily security from a 
threatening state.  Concerning international politics, Waltz states, “In the quest for 
security, alliances have to be made.”  He highlights that, “Alliances are made by states 
that have some but not all of their interests in common.  The common interest is 
ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states.”112  Walt continues this discussion by 
asserting that states will join alliances when they view a state as increasingly threatening 
due to any combination of the following four factors: 1) aggregate power; 2) proximity; 
3) defensive capability; and 4) offensive intentions.113  Walt contends “the more 
 
112 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 166. 
113 Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security, vol. 
9, 4 (Spring 1985): 9, http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0162-
2889%28198521%299%3A4%3AAFATBO%3E2.0CO%3B2-K (accessed 20 July 2007). 
 44
                                                
aggressive or expansionist a state appears, the more likely it is to trigger an opposing 
coalition.”114 Ultimately, the logic of alliance building is that there is strength in 
numbers.  While this is an oversimplification, alliance building helps in international 
venues, helps in economic statecraft, and strengthens the ability of small states to resist 
hegemonic pretensions.  In this respect, the logic of alliance building directly correlates 
with the strategy of soft balancing. 
Following T.V. Paul’s definition of soft balancing as activity “which involves the 
formation of limited diplomatic coalitions or ententes”115 among small states, and Robert 
Pape’s understanding of the concept as “actions that do not directly challenge U.S. 
military preponderance but that use nonmilitary tools to delay, frustrate, and undermine 
aggressive unilateral U.S. military policies;” this chapter will present the “nonmilitary 
tools”116 that Chavez has chosen to wield in his attempt to build opposition to American 
hegemony.  Specifically, those tools are international institutions, economic statecraft, 
and diplomatic arrangements.  This chapter reveals how Hugo Chavez uses the tools of 
soft balancing to challenge United States’ preponderance in the international system. 
B. SOFT BALANCING VIA CHAVISMO 
This thesis opened with a quote taken from a speech delivered by President Hugo 
Chavez to the United Nations General Assembly in 2006.   In his speech, characterized 
by fiery anti-Bush rhetoric, Chavez verbalizes the fears and apprehensions of small states 
concerning U.S. unilateralism.  The most notable aspect of this verbal attack on American 
hegemony in the General Assembly was the warm reception it received from those 
nations in attendance.  Skeptics contend that Chavez’s verbal assault is nothing more than 
hot air, a vain attempt to gain supporters for his cause.  Yet, Chavez’s efforts at 
challenging the Western Hemisphere’s hegemon go beyond fiery rhetoric, and deserve 
more attention than Washington has yet to bestow.  The United States lack of focus may 
be because Venezuela does not appear as threatening due to its lack of traditional hard 
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power resources, or because Chavez’s caudillo leadership style is easily written off by 
analysts.  Whatever the case, when scrutinized, Chavez’s efforts at challenging the 
United States appear to grasp the main tenets of soft balancing.   
1. International Institutions 
Since Hugo Chavez assumed the presidency of Venezuela in 1999, he has made 
concerted efforts to gain an influential role in regional and international affairs.  In an 
article for The Washington Post, Michael Shifter explains Chavez’s ambitions; 
“Venezuela was too small for [Chavez].  He wants to be a global leader who can shape 
the international agenda.  This is sort of a shift to being involved in decision-making on 
very sensitive international and political affairs.”117  This effort to gain international 
influence was epitomized in Venezuela’s effort to gain a two-year seat on the 15-member 
U.S. Security Council (UNSC) in late 2006. 
Chavez has sent a mixed message concerning participation in international 
organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS).  Since the brief coup 
in 2002, Chavez adopted an antagonistic stance toward the regional organization; most 
recently attacking the OAS for challenging his right to shut down a television station in 
Venezuela that he claimed was undermining the government.118  Chavez’s chief 
complaint about the OAS seems to be that they are a puppet of Washington, and any 
agenda connected to Washington viewed as suspect.  Even if Chavez views the OAS as a 
puppet organization, he still understands the power that it holds which is evident in his 
growing legacy of adversarial participation since 2001. 
The Third Summit of the Americas involved the 34 member nations formulating 
an official document that sought to affirm the place of democracy in the hemisphere and 
guard against nondemocratic government action.  The result was a 28 article document 
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titled the Inter-American Democratic Charter and was heralded as a grounding breaking 
work for setting guidelines concerning democratic governance in the hemisphere.119  
Chavez viewed the Democratic Charter as another opportunity for the United States to 
meddle in the affairs of Latin American when their form of democracy does not meet the 
expectations of Washington, and vigorously opposed it.  For Chavez the Democratic 
Charter represented “U.S. efforts in the OAS to create mechanisms of preventive 
intervention whenever democracy was in jeopardy.”120  Despite concerted efforts by 
Chavez to resist the Democratic Charter, he reluctantly signed the document at the urging 
of his Latin American neighbors.  This incident marked the beginning of a strained 
relationship between Venezuela and the OAS. 
Chavez again used the venue of the OAS in 2005 as an international institution to 
reframe the hemispheric debate away from US concerns and towards his own.  One of the 
goals of the November 2005 Summit of the Americas was to come to an agreement on 
free trade in the region.  For Washington, this meant reviving the Free-Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA).121  Chavez successfully high jacked the agenda of the Summit by 
touting the FTAA “as an effort by the wealthier states in the hemisphere to exploit the 
poor.”122 By vigorously opposing the FTAA within the Summit and simultaneously 
taking his anti-U.S. rhetoric to the people, he was able to undermine U.S. policy in Latin 
America.   
After his apparent success in the OAS to obstruct the FTAA, Chavez sought to 
undermine U.S. interests beyond Latin America.  In 2006, after his notorious address to 
the General Assembly, Chavez embarked on a worldwide campaign to gain a seat on the 
UNSC.  Supported by fellow Venezuelan officials who viewed this campaign as 
necessary for the larger effort of stemming “American imperialism,” Chavez embarked 
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on a worldwide tour to countries with lingering dislike or outright hatred of the U.S. that 
included Russia, Iran, Syria, China, Vietnam, and Belarus.  The Washington Post 
reported that Chavez was successful in garnering support from permanent UNSC 
members Russia and China and would have been supported by the General Assembly.123  
Unfortunately for Chavez, his efforts did not come to fruition.  Confronted by a vigorous 
campaign by the U.S. to thwart any attempt by Chavez at a UNSC seat, Venezuela was 
forced to withdraw its bid and support Panama. 
In hindsight, Chavez’s failure in gaining a UNSC seat can be attributed to two 
factors – a well financed effort by the U.S. to prevent it, and Chavez’s own raucous 
rhetoric.  Citing his fiery speech in the General Assembly, many diplomats feared that 
Chavez would turn the UN into a circus.124  Nevertheless, despite Chavez’s failure to 
gain a seat on the UNSC, his efforts demonstrated his belief in the power of international 
institutions and the legitimacy that serious participation would gain.  Furthermore, the 
U.S. State Department’s resolve in preventing Chavez, demonstrated Washington’s fear 
of the power that Chavez would gain in such a role.  There are certainly lessons to be 
learned by small states of the importance in international participation; the 
Venezuelan/UNSC case unfortunately highlights the difficulty of balancing great powers 
in the international arena.   
Convincing Chavez that the OAS is a viable international organization that could 
limit American influence in Latin America could be a tough sell.  However, additional 
efforts to soft balance preponderant power may be found in economic statecraft.  And it is 
within the realm of economics that Chavez appears to be exerting the most effort. 
2. Economic Statecraft 
The second component of soft balancing falls in the realm of economic statecraft.  
Succinctly stated, this component seeks to increase the cost of “business as usual” for the 
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hegemon.  There are several ways to increase costs.  A country might increase economic 
ties with countries currently sanctioned by the hegemon in an effort to negate the efforts 
of the hegemon.  Another method would be to oppose a regional trade bloc led by the 
hegemon and influence other states to follow.  Chavez has taken both routes in his effort 
to undermine U.S. hegemony.  His fight to undermine the Free Trade Area of the 
Americas (FTAA) with his own trade bloc deserves serious consideration. 
President Chavez opposes the planned FTAA, considering it as another attempt at 
control of Latin America by the United States, and views the labels of “Most Favored 
Nation” and “National Treatment” as threats to sovereignty to those countries that pursue 
other policies.  In fact, he has stated his intention for Venezuela to withdraw from the 
Andean Free trade association because Columbia and Peru reached free trade agreements 
with the U.S., which he sees as undermining the motivations for the trade bloc.  He has 
made similar claims about the Mercosur trade bloc, claiming that these multilateral 
associations “serve the business elites, the transnational companies but not the Indians, 
the blacks, the poor, the whites.  [They don’t] serve our country.”125 Chavez has proven 
his rhetoric to be more than hot air by providing an alternative for Latin America. 
Chavez’s drive to provide a legitimate alternative to U.S. led trade blocs is 
evident in his proposal for his own alternative to the U.S. sponsored FTAA, the 
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA).  While not clearly defined, the ALBA 
would be an aid network financed largely by Venezuelan oil profits.  Already he has 
committed $3 billion a year to support this initiative.126  The Banco Comercio Exterior 
(Bancoex) summarizes ALBA as such: “ALBA appeals to the egalitarian principles of 
justice and equality that are innate in human beings, the well-being of the most disposed 
sectors of society, and a reinvigorated sense of solidarity toward the underdeveloped 
countries of the western hemisphere, so that with the required assistance, they can enter 
into trade negotiations on more favorable terms than has been the case under the dictates 
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of developed countries.”127  By prioritizing food self-sufficiency, opposing intellectual 
property rights regimes, and denouncing liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, 
the ALBA pushes for solidarity with the economically weakest countries – all the while 
financed by Venezuelan oil profits.   
Venezuela’s economy is supported by its enormous oil exports, and as such, its 
economic statecraft revolves around the oil trade.  The fact that Venezuela is a top-ten 
producer of oil in the world places the country within a certain dynamic that has proven 
advantageous for Chavez.128  Increases in world oil prices over the last few years have 
allowed Chavez to expand his Bolivarian Socialist initiatives through increased 
government social spending.  Internationally, increased oil revenue has allowed him to 
expand commercial ties to other countries, while boosting his own profile.129  The 
Venezuelan leader is directly responsible for this economic landfall. 
In an effort to decrease its reliance on oil exports to the U.S., Chavez has taken a 
more active role in OPEC.  When Chavez assumed power in 1999, the price per barrel of 
crude had spiraled downward to $10.80.  After successfully orchestrating in 2000 only 
the second OPEC summit since its inception, Chavez reinvigorated the oil cartel.130  
Chavez urged his fellow members to cut oil output, and by 2007 a floor of $50 per barrel 
had been reached.131  In taking a more active role in OPEC, Chavez was able to foster 
lasting and meaningful relationships with other countries in the Middle East outside the 
influence of Washington.  
In August, 2006, Simon Romero reported for The New York Times that, 
“Venezuela has long cultivated ties with Middle Eastern governments, finding common 
ground in trying to keep oil prices high, but its recent engagement of Iran has become a 
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defining element in its effort to build an alliance to curb American influence in 
developing countries.”132  Later that same year, a series of accords were signed by the 
two countries that include deals to develop oil fields, build factories, and setup a $2 
billion investment fund to finance these and other joint projects.133  Chavez has 
strengthened economic ties with Iran beyond the oil sector with efforts to train teachers in 
Venezuela, produce manioc starch (food starch) for his new Middle Eastern ally, and 
various ventures throughout the commercial sector.134 
Chavez has reached out to other countries that sit outside the “good graces” of 
Washington to reduce Venezuela’s dependency on the U.S. oil market.  In the past year, 
Chavez has gained extensive ground in deepening relations with China and Iran.  
Venezuelan crude and petroleum product exports to China have increased over the past 
five years, expanding the diversification of its petroleum export destinations away from 
the United States.135  In March, 2007, the Economist Intelligence Unit reported that “Mr. 
Chavez and Chinese Communist Party Politburo member Li Changchun signed six co-
operation agreements, mostly in the energy sector, focused on joint-ventures to explore 
for new oil and gas deposits in both countries, and to extract, transport, store and refine 
these resources.”136 By diversifying its oil markets and increasing its role in OPEC, 
Venezuela has increased the cost of U.S. retaliation. 
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3. Diplomatic Arrangements 
The third component of soft balancing - diplomatic arrangements - builds upon 
the other two aspects of this strategy by capitalizing on the relationships fostered from 
participation within international institutions, and further solidified through economic 
statecraft.  Significant diplomatic arrangements are imperative to building a successful 
soft balancing strategy because they are the building blocks for future alliances or 
ententes.  Chavez came out of the gates in a sprint to ensure positive diplomatic relations 
with nations he saw as pivotal in undermining U.S. hegemony.  This claim is supported 
by Gerver Torres, a former Venezuelan government minister, who stated in March 2005, 
that “[Chavez] is trying to bring together all the enemies of the United States.  He 
believes the United States is the devil.”137  Chavez himself understands the power in 
uniting many states against one, stating to al-Jazeera, “What can we do regarding the 
imperialist power of the United States?  We have no choice but to unite.”138  His efforts 
to unite against the United States have gained traction regionally and internationally. 
Regionally, Chavez has sought to cement diplomatic relations with fellow 
socialists, such as his protégé, Evo Morales, in Bolivia, and his mentor in Cuba, Fidel 
Castro.  During his campaign for President of Bolivia, Morales enjoyed strong economic 
support from his fellow leftist in Venezuela and has cemented relations with Chavez 
since coming to power.  The two socialists are always ready to defend the actions of the 
other when attacked for their domestic policies.  Chavez continues to foster diplomatic 
relations with leaders in Central America.  His domestic and economic policies are being 
pursued in Ecuador, where President Rafael Correa came to power in 2006 and promised 
to follow the lead of Venezuela’s leader.139  Given the increasing disenchantment over 
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the years with global capitalisms promise to improve living conditions in countries who 
adhere to the economic tenants pushed by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, Chavez’s populist message has struck a resounding cord of 
understanding with countries like Peru and Nicaragua.  This common ideological footing 
has opened the diplomatic door and nurtured friendships for Chavez throughout Latin 
America. 
Beyond Latin America, Chavez has made extensive gains in the diplomatic arena.  
Within the first year of his presidency, Chavez toured ten countries in Asia, Europe, and 
the Middle East.140  In January 2005, Venezuela and China signed 19 cooperation 
agreements concerning oil, agriculture, and technology.141  With over 60% of 
Venezuelan oil exported to the United States, agreements like these attempt to diversify 
their markets and decrease dependency on the U.S.   
Chavez has spent significant time in Russia in an attempt to strengthen political 
ties with a strategic partner in energy while bolstering relations with a veto-holding 
member of the UNSC.  Beyond economic benefits, Chavez and Russia are linked 
ideologically in their distrust of America and have vocalized their solidarity in limiting 
U.S. preponderance.142  Likewise, he has vigorously defended Iran’s right to develop 
nuclear energy and lambasted Washington’s reproach of Tehran’s nuclear ambitions.  As 
mentioned earlier, this relationship has blossomed into a reciprocal entente where 
Venezuela has agreed to embark on a joint venture with Iran, trading technologies 
associated with oil production, and nuclear energy.   
The varying aspects of soft balancing strategies highlight how easily states can 
transition from economic partners to diplomatic allies.  The resulting relationship 
between Venezuela and Iran has reduced the cost for Iranian refusal to abide by 
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international restrictions led by the United States concerning their nuclear program.  If 
this relationship proves anything, it is that soft balancing strategies by smaller states can 
seriously infringe on the interests of great powers. 
C. CONCLUSION 
So what do Chavez’s actions convey to Washington and the rest of the world?  
Whether or not Chavez has specifically drawn up a soft balancing strategy, his actions 
certainly reflect such intentions above and beyond the obvious anti-American rhetoric.  
To reiterate Pape’s argument, “Soft balancing measures do not directly challenge a 
unipolar leader’s military preponderance, but they can delay, complicate, or increase the 
costs of using that extraordinary power.”143  At home and abroad Chavez has stepped up 
to the plate to bat against U.S. hegemony.  Through international institutions he has tried 
to gain a more influential position in world affairs.  By forging strong economic 
relationships with countries like China and Iran, Chavez seeks to limit the amount of 
influence Washington can have on Venezuelan affairs; meanwhile, Chavez can still 
economically support his petrol-fueled Bolivarian endeavor.  By engaging diplomatically 
with countries outside the “good graces” of Washington, those members of the “axis of 
evil,” Chavez appears to be forming a loose alliance of sorts, an “axis of unity;” 
unfortunately they are united against the United States. 
While Chavez’s record has seen little success in challenging the United States, the 
fact that he has stepped up to the plate at all is impressive and this follows the goal of soft 
balancing – not to defeat the threat but to limit its scope.  According to Pape, limiting the 
scope of the threat is accomplished by “building cooperation with nonmilitary tools.”144  
In order to gain ground internationally, Chavez’s soft balancing strategy needs to be 
better resourced.  These resources may be found in what Joseph Nye dubbed as “soft 
power”.  The next chapter addresses the concept of soft power in regards to small state 
ability to recognize its soft power resources, and utilized them to resource a soft 
balancing strategy. 
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IV. RESOURCING THE STRATEGY: SOFT POWER 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The traditional method used by states to secure their interests abroad has been 
accomplished through hard power tactics that utilize superior military force and 
traditional “carrot and stick” applications.  The first chapter noted that as the international 
system moved toward unipolarity at the end of the Cold War, the use of hard power 
tactics by states as a means to an end, such as the threat of military force, became less 
likely.  Having discussed the concept of soft balancing and its application toward small 
state challenges to hegemony, the discussion now turns toward soft power.  This chapter 
extends Joseph Nye’s argument that hard means have been replaced by softer tactics, 
such as soft balancing, that are girded by ‘soft power’.  Nye first developed the concept 
of ‘soft power’ in his 1990 book, Bound to Lead, and then further developed it in his 
2004 book, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.  It should be noted at 
this juncture that the concept of soft power as a resource for soft balancing strategies is 
not explicitly stated by Nye, yet the connection between the two exists.   
This chapter argues that soft power is an important aspect of any soft balancing 
strategy for small states; yet, it is extremely difficult to wield.  It is therefore extremely 
important for small states to understand what aspects of soft power they have control of, 
if any.  Though Hugo Chavez has not explicitly stated any intent to harness soft power to 
further his Bolivarian Revolution, his actions in this regard are characteristically “soft” in 
nature.  For that reason, the case of Hugo Chavez and Venezuela serves as a good 






                                                
B. SOFT POWER AS A RESOURCE 
It is important to restate what is ‘soft power’?  Nye defines soft power as “the 
ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”145  It is 
the ability to shape the preferences of others by presenting your culture, political ideals, 
and policies as legitimate ends in and of themselves.  The currency of soft power rests not 
in military or economic coercion, but in “an attraction to shared values and the justness 
and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values.”146  According to Nye, soft 
power behavior is exhibited through agenda setting, attraction through culture and 
political ideals, and co-optation.  The resources to exert soft power are found both 
domestically and internationally.  Domestically, a state draws on the attractiveness of its 
values, culture, and policies.  In terms of culture, Nye distinguishes between high culture 
and popular culture.147  High culture encompasses “friendships of future world leaders” 
through academic and scientific exchanges.  The more well-known popular culture aspect 
of soft power encompasses everything from sporting events, entertainment, and 
commercial products, to outward manifestations of democracy, such as protest 
movements.  Beyond culture, the domestic values and policies of a state that are seen as 
legitimate and democratic are powerful sources of attraction.  Internationally, states seek 
to set the agendas in international institutions that serve their ends.  In this sense, soft 
power represents a type of currency or resource in the realm of international diplomacy 
when these resources, such as culture and domestic politics, are seen as desirable and 
attractive.  When domestic and international resources are combined, states seek to co-opt 
a ‘coalition of the willing’ that will help to reach its goals.  Therefore, states are not 
physically, through threats of use of force or sanctions, causing states to bend to their 
will, but are enticing states to see their cause as the right cause.  In effect, soft power can 
serve as a powerful resource of soft balancing strategies. 
 
145 Nye, Jr., Joseph S. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics. (New York, NY: Public 
Affairs, 2004). x. 
146 Ibid., 7. 
147 Ibid., 44. 
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If Chavez has employed a soft balancing strategy to counter U.S. preponderance, 
and soft power serves as a resource for such strategies, then it would follow that Chavez 
has sought to build a great deal of soft power during his tenure in office.  This chapter 
seeks to identify Chavez’s sources of soft power in regards to powers of attraction. Nye 
explains why soft power is such a difficult resource to utilize: “It is not enough just to 
have visible power resources.  In the case of soft power, the question is what messages 
are sent and received by whom under which circumstances, and how that affects our 
ability to obtain the outcomes we want.”148  With this in mind, Hugo Chavez’s efforts in 
Venezuela beg a larger question – can small states ever hope to build significant soft 
power to achieve their ends?  In order to answer this question, other questions must be 
addressed: Who is receiving Chavez’s anti-American message and how has it been 
received? 
C. ASSESSING VENEZUELA’S SOFT POWER  
Soft power behaviors are embodied in three realms of diplomacy as already noted: 
agenda setting, power of attraction, and the ability to co-opt allies.  Chapter Three 
examined Chavez’s efforts to soft balance American preponderance which relied heavily 
on the co-optation of like-minded states regionally and internationally.  This chapter 
focuses on the other two behaviors associated with building soft power: attraction and 
agenda setting.  Attraction and agenda setting are unique components of soft power in 
that they build upon each other yet may have different target audiences.  Attraction is 
difficult to build because what attracts some may repulse others.  Evident in Chavez’s 
efforts to challenge American preponderance, he has sought an international status that 
would allow for the successful application of each behavior.  His actions in the U.N., 
OPEC, and regional institutions attest to his efforts to set the agenda of each organization.  
Chavez’s Bolivarian rhetoric that preaches the imperatives of national sovereignty, while 
fighting corruption and inequality, and directly challenging the United States, seeks to 
build the attractiveness of his cause.  The next two subsections run through the primary 
currencies of both soft power behaviors. 
 
148 Nye, Soft Power, 44. 
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1. Powers of Attraction 
Along with its values and policies the attractiveness of a country’s culture is a 
large aspect of its potential soft power.  Nye emphasizes, “When a country’s culture 
includes universal values and its policies promote values and interests that others share, it 
increases the probability of obtaining its desired outcomes because of the relationships of 
attraction and duty that it creates.  Narrow values and parochial cultures are less likely to 
produce soft power.”149  This passage is important in that it distinguishes the common 
attribution of popular culture to soft power and those aspects of a country’s culture 
attributed to high society, such as fine arts, music, and higher education.  America has 
been able to capitalize on all these aspects in spreading ‘American’ culture because it 
possesses strong sources in the private sector.  A strong economy is a ready testament to 
the benefits of liberal capitalism.  American universities export American ideas and 
values to the millions of international students that attend them every year.150  So where 
does this situation leave small states? A small state like Venezuela stands very little 
chance of reaching the cultural influence that America has been able to attain since the 
end of World War II.  Consequently, they must make efforts to promote those aspects of 
its culture that are most appealing.  Most likely, this strategy will only have regional 
implications. 
If it is true that small states have few cultural resources that appeal internationally, 
then they must look toward the remaining two currencies of attraction – political values 
and government policies.  Chavez risks squandering Venezuela’s soft power within these 
realms with his Socialist Bolivarian Revolution.  Venezuela, once seen as a guiding light 
for democracy in the region during the 1960’s, succumbed to the corruption that plagues 
so many Latin American countries.  Governmental corruption ate away at the democratic 
institutions in the country and was the impetus for the failed coup of 1992 led by then 
LTC Hugo Chavez.  Ironically, it was on a ticket of anti-corruption and a return to 
democratic ideals that Chavez was able to win the presidency in 1999.  Unfortunately, 
 
149 Nye, Soft Power, 11. (Italics added by this author for emphasis) 
150 Ibid., 13. 
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immediately after taking office, Chavez began to implement his Bolivarian Revolution 
for Venezuela.  This socialist mission involved rewriting the Constitution, disbanding the 
National Assembly, and consolidating more power under the presidency.  While these 
actions have gained favor for Chavez in other left-leaning nations such as Bolivia, and 
other weak democracies such as Iran and Russia, they have done little to gain support 
from the major power players of the world. 
Western critics of Chavez’s regime content that Venezuela’s domestic policies are 
becoming more socialist and less democratic.151  It has been noted that the need to wage 
war against corruption, inequality, and injustice are three themes that drive the political 
behavior of most Venezuelans.152  Chavez has clearly exploited these themes 
domestically.  However, as Chapter one outlined, the Bolivarian Socialism that Chavez 
initiated upon assuming the presidency are troubling to the international community.  His 
efforts to consolidate power under the executive by rewriting the constitution, 
undermining the judiciary, and seeking to remove presidential term limits are potentially 
problematic to the international community. Further socialist programs include a new 
land reform initiative that ultimately takes from the rich and redistributes to the poor.  
The New York Times reported that “Mr. Chavez is carrying out what may become the 
largest forced land redistribution in Venezuela's history, building utopian farming 
villages for squatters, lavishing money on new cooperatives and sending army commando 
units to supervise seized estates in six states.”153  He has nationalized the petroleum 
industry and the banks while shunning recommendations from the IMF and WTO.154  
 
151 For an in-depth analysis of the decline of democracy in Venezuela and the type of governance put 
in place by Chavez since 1999, see: Jennifer L. McCoy, and David J. Myers, eds. The Unraveling of 
Representative Democracy in Venezuela, (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004). 
152 Naim, Moises. “Introduction,” in the book by Cristina Marcano and Alberto Barrera Tyszka, Hugo 
Chavez, (NY: Random House, 2007): xix. 
153 Simon Romero, “A Clash of Hope and Fear As Venezuela Seizes Land,” New York Times, May 17, 
2007, sec A8, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1272322121&sid=13&Fmt=3&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName
=PQD (accessed 25 October 2007). 
154 Peter Howard Wertheim, “Venezuela nationalizes oil rigs; deepens Chinese ties,” Oil & Gas 
Journal, vol 105, 20 (May 28, 2007):36-38, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1278866231&sid=14&Fmt=3&clientId=11969&RQT=309&VName
=PQD (accessed 25 October 2007). 
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Most recently he has exercised a heavy hand in censoring the media by refusing to renew 
the license of the country’s oldest broadcasting company due to its anti-government 
programming.155  These socialist government policies have potentially squandered 
Venezuela’s soft power as they are seen as illegitimate by most of the world.  Few states 
will be willing to work with a leader who so overtly discards the democratic ideals that 
the majority of the world admires.  While the international community may continue to 
view Venezuela as democratic under Chavez’s Bolivarian Revolution, his efforts to 
consolidate power under the executive, restrict free-speech in the media, and other 
authoritarian measures, serve only to degrade his soft power resources by limiting his 
international appeal.  Not only do his Chavista politics degrade his powers of attraction, 
they influence any agenda setting efforts by Chavez. 
2. Agenda Setting Efforts 
The soft power resources gained from powers of attraction are gleaned from both 
popular and elite levels.  The soft power acquired from agenda setting efforts is primarily 
at the elite level, though certainly buttressed by attractive power.  Agenda setting is a 
form of co-optive power – the ability to shape what others want – “the ability to 
manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express 
some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic.”156  The seeming “unrealistic” 
political choice put forward by Chavez is his overt challenge to the United State’s 
preponderance in the international system.   
Chavez has attracted leaders to his anti-imperialist cause throughout Latin 
America.  Leaders in Bolivia, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Nicaragua have assumed the mantle 
of anti-imperialism offered by Chavez and his Bolivarian Revolution.  Ecuador’s new 
elected leader, Rafael Correa, seems to have adopted Venezuela’s political strategy of 
reorganizing government, while adding to the anti-American rhetoric, denouncing the 
 
155 Simon Romero, “Venezuela pulls the plug on anti-Chavez network,” The International Herald 
Tribune (May 28, 2007):2, http://www.lexisnexis.com/ (accessed 25 October 2007). 
156 Nye, Soft Power, 7. 
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United States as an “empire.”157  Though not as outspoken as these, fellow socialist in 
Chile, Brazil, and Argentina have offered cautious support for Chavez’s call for regional 
unity, while hoping to tone down some of his more harsher rhetoric.  Chile’s president 
Bachelet conceded during Venezuela’s bid for the UNSC seat that a vote for Guatemala 
and not Venezuela “would be a signal of little independence from the United States.”158  
By willing to overlook the differences between Venezuela and Chile, Bachelet concedes 
her willingness to support Chavez’s agenda.  The same Washington Post article that 
quoted Bachelet posits that for states like Brazil and Argentina, “solidarity with a 
neighbor matters more than solidarity with other democracies, and that their governments 
prefer a weaker United States to a chastened Hugo Chavez.”159  By calling on Bolivarian 
ideals that promote Latin American solidarity, and showing a willingness to openly 
challenge the United States, Chavez appears to build soft power within this spectrum of 
behavior.  The following section presents the great difficulty that Chavez has had in 
utilizing and maintaining his soft power. 
D. CHAVEZ’S CHALLENGE TO WIELD SOFT POWER 
Are Venezuela’s soft power resources declining because of Chavez’s Bolivarian 
revolution?  What amount of any of the three components of soft power, agenda setting, 
attraction, and co-optation, ensure success in a broader soft balancing strategy?   These 
are difficult questions to answer and they highlight the inherent complexity in harnessing 
soft power to purposively reach any ends.  Joseph Nye states, “Soft power is more 
difficult to wield, because…many of its crucial resources are outside the control of 
governments, and their effects depend heavily on acceptance by the receiving audiences.  
Moreover, soft-power resources often work indirectly by shaping the environment for 
 
157 “Venezuela’s Satellites,” The Washington Post, January 28, 2007, 
http://proquest.umi.com/pqdweb?did=1204119991&sid=3&Fmt=3&clientld=11969&RQT=309&VName=
PQD (accessed 28 November 2007). 
158 Jackson Diehl, “Chavez’s U.N. Moment, Why do Latin Democrats Support Him?” The 
Washington Post, October 16, 2006, sec A.21, 
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policy, and sometimes take years to produce the desired outcomes.”160  Chavez’s 
domestic and foreign policies tread a thin line in regards to understanding that soft power 
is “the ability to get the outcomes you want without having to force people to change 
their behavior through threats or payments.”161  As long as he maintains a heavy hand in 
the affairs of Venezuela, he risks eroding his regime’s soft power. 
How has Chavez eroded his soft power resources?  First, Chavez’s own anti-
American rhetoric has potentially cost him credibility.  In the information age, where 
everything uttered is available across the world, one’s efforts to attract some may repel 
others.  Soft power is essentially a two edged sword.  When communicating to the world 
his intention to challenge the regional hegemon by calling their elected leader “the devil,” 
Chavez opened a Pandora’s Box of bad publicity from Western based media firms.  The 
fact that his rhetoric is always so charismatic and abrasive in nature leads critics to 
discount him as just another caudillo, discounting his credibility as a legitimate leader.  
Nye emphasizes the importance of credibility as a “crucial resource, and an important 
source of soft power.”162  By nature, a credible leader is much more attractive. 
Credibility lies in the legitimacy of the leader’s administration and the fulfillment 
of his promises.  Chavez gained the presidency in 1999 by running on an anticorruption 
platform.  Yet, eight years later, his regime has become mired in accusations of 
corruption.  As Chavez continues to erode the democratic foundations in Venezuela, he 
risks losing not only international support for his regime, but regional and domestic 
backing.  This thesis attempts to glean the perceived attractiveness of Chavez’s values 
and policies by pulling data from two different sources, Transparency International and 
Latinobarometro Corporation. These sources attempt to poll both elite and popular 
perceptions of Chavez’s regime while following Nye’s assumption that “polls are a good 
first approximation of both how attractive a country appears and the costs that are 
incurred by unpopular policies, particularly when they show consistency across polls and 
 
160 Nye, Soft Power, 99. 
161 Ibid., 15. 
162 Ibid., 106. 
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over time.”163 The following section draws on elite perceptions of Chavez’s regime by 
pulling data from the Corruption Perceptions Index produced by Transparency 
International.  Next, data from the Latinobarometro Survey is utilized to gauge popular 
perception of the Chavez regime. 
1. Evaluating Perceptions 
Produced by Transparency International, The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
is a composite index that draws on multiple expert opinion surveys that poll perceptions 
of public sector corruption and the level of confidence the regimes in 180 countries 
around the world.  This survey is relevant to this study because it illuminates elite 
perception of the Chavez regime at the international level.  Evaluating Chavez’s regime 
in relation to its level of corruption is particularly significant because it is an indicator of 
how attractive it is to the international community.  The values and polices of the Chavez 
regime directly contribute the level of corruption perceived by the survey respondents.  In 
follows that the more corrupt a regime is viewed to be, the less amount of soft power is it 
likely to possess.  Since 2002, Venezuela’s CPI score has increased while confidence in 
the nation’s leadership has decreased.164 
 
163 Nye, Soft Power, 18. 
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Figure 2.   2002-2007 CPI Ranking for Venezuela 
 
As seen in Figures 1 and 2, Transparency International has recorded a steady 
increase in the level of corruption in Venezuela since 2002.  As a result Venezuela’s rank 
among all other states has plummeted to 162, down 81 positions since 2002.  These elite 
opinions of Chavez’s regime appear to discredit his Bolivarian Revolution as a more 
honest government than the one it replaced.  The increase in perceived corruption 
suggests a decline in attractive soft power within the elite levels of the international 
community.   
Since soft power is about the ability to build attraction, then it follows that if 
Chavez has been successful in marketing Bolivarian Socialism, data should demonstrate a 
regional movement or inclination in that direction among the popular levels.  In order to 
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see if the region is attracted to Chavez’s Revolution, this thesis relies upon the work 
conducted by the Latinbarómetro Corporation, a non-profit organization based in 
Santiago, Chile.  Since 1995, the Latinbarómetro Corporation has surveyed 18 countries 
in the region on a range of issues.165  Important to this thesis is their work concerning 
popular opinions on democracy and world leaders.   
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Figure 3.   Venezuelan Confidence in Democracy 
 
When Latin American countries were surveyed in 2006 concerning the status of 
democracy, they were asked, “Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree 
with the following statement?  Democracy may have problems but it is the best system of 
government.”  The results were quite positive when compiled with the results since 2002.  
As Figure 3 shows, the level of confidence in democracy has remained steady with a 
slight upward trend between 2005 and 2006.  Additionally, the number of individuals 
who were not sure about the definition of democracy declined, demonstrating a regional 
improvement in understanding the components of democracy.The continued adherence to 
democracy in the region suggests that Latin Americans have not become disenchanted 
                                                 
165 All statistics and data for tables and figures are drawn from the yearly reports published on the 
Latinbarómetro Corporation website and can be retrieved at 
http://www.latinobarometro.org/index.php?id=150.  
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with democracy as a fair form of governance or discarded it in favor of socialism despite 
continuing issues of corruption.  When explored further, the survey reveals that 
Venezuelan’s hold the second highest regard for democracy in the region at 89%, well 
above the regional average of 74%. (See Figure 4)   
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Figure 4.   Latin American Confidence in Democray (From: Latinobarometro Report 
2006) 
 
The polling data in Table 1 provides further insight into the level of confidence in 
democracy that Venezuelans proclaim regardless of Chavez’s Bolivarian revolution.  The 
survey gauged citizens’ hopes of improving individually and nationally under a 
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Uruguay 89% 79% 75% 
Venezuela 89% 78% 76% 
Dominican Rep. 87% 72% 84% 
Argentina 85% 70% 72% 
Costa Rica 80% 66% 71% 
Panama 78% 61% 65% 
Bolivia 76% 59% 67% 
Columbia 76% 56% 68% 
Brazil 74% 50% 70% 
Chile 74% 61% 62% 
Peru 69% 45% 63% 
Guatemala 69% 475 67% 
Mexico 68% 58% 69% 
Nicaragua 68% 44% 70% 
Ecuador 66% 38% 48% 
Honduras 66% 46% 65% 
El Salvador 60% 39% 49% 
Paraguay 54% 38% 50% 
Latin America 74% 56% 66% 
Table 1.   Latin American Insight into Democracy (From: Latinobarometro Report 2006) 
 
These findings suggest two possibilities in regards to Chavez’s abilities to rally 
the region to Bolivarian Socialism.  First, they suggest that Chavez has quite simply been 
unable to sell his product and that he remains in power only as long as he adheres to some 
vestige of democracy.  The other possibility is that the region’s understanding of  
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democracy is limited – meaning that as long as they are able to vote periodically the 
government remains democratic.  While this last point is unsettling, the answer probably 
lies somewhere in between.   
Probably the easiest way to measure the attractiveness of one’s policies and 
individual credibility is to evaluate the region’s image of the leader in question.  The 
Latinbarómetro Corporation began in 2005 to accomplish just this task by asking 
respondents to evaluate foreign leaders on a 0 to 10 scale, where 0 means a very bad 
evaluation and 10 very good.  The resulting data is very interesting when comparing the 
responses to Chavez and President Bush.  In 2005, Chavez scored 5.2 in South America, 
4.5 in Central America and 5 for all of Latin America.  Surprisingly, President Bush 
scored remarkably similar marks: 4.1 in South America, 5.6 in Central America and 4.8 
for all of Latin America.  The results for 2006 are even more surprising that both Chavez 
and President Bush receive an overall score of 4.6, just slightly better than Castro at 4.4.   
The results of this survey demonstrate the great difficulty of wielding soft power, 
of effectively attracting others to join a cause.  Despite an incredibly unpopular war in 
Iraq and Chavez’s call to arms against the Bush administration’s unilateral foreign 
policies, Chavez is still unable to surpass President Bush in a public opinion poll, even 
one conducted in his backyard.  How much harder then is it to resource soft power 
internationally? 
E. CONCLUSION 
The difficulty of wielding soft power lies within its very nature.  As such, it 
leaves much room for error – in that state leaders do not directly control the sources of 
soft power, such as culture or the sentiments of the intended audience.  However, state 
leaders do have significant opportunity to influence another source of soft power - 
domestic policies – especially those that appeal to the international community.  The task 
is not as easy as simply adopting a version of democracy; the ability to forecast how the 
world receives and interprets a state’s domestic politics is not entirely within the realm of 
state control.  An intense information campaign could help bolster the state’s cause but 
the ability to conduct such are limited by money, prestige, and egotism.   
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How do small states like Venezuela overcome the hurdles of wielding soft power?  
First, they must identify their intended audience.  Is it the population or the international 
elites?  Second, who the intended audience is dictates the type of rhetoric, the domestic 
and foreign policy strategy that appeals to the intended audience while still serving the 
national interests. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SOFT BALANCING IMPLICATIONS FOR SMALL STATES 
1. Hegemonic Defiance 
This thesis began with three objectives: first, to illuminate the international 
hierarchy within a unipolar international order; second, to identify small state challenges 
to the international order under this system; and, third, to identify soft balancing as a 
potential path small states pursue to challenge the hegemonic power while seeking to 
draw on soft power resources.  The case of Venezuela and Hugo Chavez is an interesting 
one as this piece has highlighted.  Chavez provides an overt example of hegemonic 
defiance within the same hemisphere as the hegemonic power.  As this thesis has shown, 
he has made extraordinary steps to build relationships with other regimes outside the 
good graces of Washington.  These relationships, with countries like Iran, limit the scope 
of Washington’s own foreign policy in regards to securing United States interests abroad.  
Simply stated, soft balancing efforts by small states like Venezuela raise the cost of doing 
business as usual for America.  However, most small states tread a thin line when it 
comes to soft balancing in that they potentially can raise their own costs due to the level 
of interconnectedness between it and the hegemonic power.   
2. Globalization and the Interconnected Predicament 
Most small states by their very nature maintain economies that are linked to some 
degree with larger states, especially the United States.  The degree of this linkage 
determines whether their economies are interconnected or interdependent.  The 
distinction is important because it determines what the cost is of challenging the larger 
state.  Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye defined interdependence as mutual dependence 
between countries resulting from international transactions of money, goods, people, and 
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technology.166  They point out that interdependence need not be mutually beneficial.  
Globalization has increased interconnectedness on an astronomical scale, yet 
interconnectedness is not synonymous with interdependence.  “Where there are 
reciprocal (although not necessarily symmetrical) costly effects of transactions, there is 
interdependence.  Where interactions do not have significant costly effects, there is 
simply interconnectedness.”167  Understanding levels of interdependence is important 
because it sheds light on the relationship between nations, specifically, it points to who 
has more power or influence along lines of dependency.  The linkages, both economically 
and politically, between nations that foster interconnectedness and interdependence must 
be understood in order to interpret state response.  As Robert Gilpin has noted, 
“Individual states have a powerful incentive either to decrease their own dependence on 
other states through such policies as trade protection and industrial policies or to increase 
the dependence of other states upon them through such policies as foreign aid and trade 
concessions.”168  The crux of Chavez’s anti-American agenda is to lesson dependence on 
the United States; however, because of the immense oil linkages between the two 
countries, he can only pursue this agenda so far.  Further research to determine how 
interconnected or interdependent the Venezuelan and United States’ economies are would 
provide valuable information to policy makers in helping to formulate an effective 
strategy to secure U.S. interests in the region. 
B. SOFT BALANCING IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
1. Engaging Third-Tier States (Again) 
In chapter three, this thesis presented Stephen Walt’s argument that states will 
join alliances when they view a state as increasingly threatening due to any combination 
of the following four factors: 1) aggregate power; 2) proximity; 3) defensive capability; 
 
166 Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. Power and Interdependence.  (Glenview, Ill: Scott, 
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and 4) offensive intentions.169  This thesis asserts that these four factors are still relevant 
when determining third-tier state response to United States’ foreign policy.  The 
aggregate power of the United States far surpasses that of any state; the ability to rapidly 
deploy forces makes proximity a moot point; both factors directly inhibit any defensive 
capability; and the last six years demonstrate an increased willingness to pursue offensive 
operations against perceived threat to the United States.  It is no wonder that third-tier 
states, like Venezuela, have sought allies to challenge U.S. preponderance in the 
international system. 
So what are policy makers to do?  The obvious answer is one that has been argued 
for some time – increased and prolonged engagement.  In the same 1985 article in which 
Walt proposed the four factors, he posits that “America’s knee-jerk opposition to leftist 
forces in the developing world should be abandoned.”170  If this was true during the Cold 
War, then positive engagement of regime’s viewed to be outside the United State’s 
version of representative democracy is imperative to assuaging threat perceptions of these 
third-tier states.  Formulating a foreign policy that clearly identifies the United States 
intentions and interests in a region is imperative to this task.  Washington’s policy makers 
need to reach out to small state diplomats, and begin a serious dialogue with the aim of 
understanding their fears and anxieties. Responding to anti-American rhetoric with 
equally harsh rhetoric only heightens tensions and plays into the hands of the perpetrator.  
A shift in means is needed to deal with defiant states. 
2. A Shift in Means 
One of the greatest challenges to Washington’s leadership is deciding how to deal 
with defiant states and their leaders who are intent on undermining the United States’ 
power in the international system.  The United States’ hands are somewhat tied when 
dealing with Hugo Chavez and his Bolivarian revolution for Venezuela.  The Democratic 
Charter of the OAS prevents any overt subversion of the current regime, as does 
customary international law, and the UN Charter.  Washington’s efforts to promote 
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democracy through entities such as the NED and USAID are limited due to Chavez’s 
own restrictions of their operations in Venezuela.  Furthermore, as Chavez holds on to 
some semblance of democracy in Venezuela he holds off any consideration of the U.S. to 
flex its hard power muscles.  However, “When the United States focuses sustained 
attention, good things generally happen. Attention is more intense when American 
security is at stake.”171 
Traditionally, the United States deals with states outside of their good-graces 
through several national security strategies: compellence, coercive diplomacy, deterrence, 
preemption/prevention, and reassurance. Most of these strategies revolve around threats 
leveraged either overtly or covertly.  In regards to Venezuela, and most third-tier states 
that do not present an overt military threat, deterrence is not applicable.  Deterrence 
entails leveraging hard power against hard power with a real threat to intervene militarily.  
In this regard, military preemption or prevention also would be outside the purview of 
diplomacy in dealing with third tier states – the international community would not allow 
it.  Similarly, the threat by defiant states should not warrant preemptive or preventive 
action.  The less military foreign policy options of compellance and coercive diplomacy 
would prove difficult to employ with a third tier state leader like Chavez who would view 
such strategies as threatening. 
Engagement through multilateral institutions represents a nonmilitary option to 
safeguard American interests while not increasing the threat.  Multilateral participation 
also increases legitimacy in the international view, which in turn builds attractive soft 
power.  Just because the international is unipolar does not mean that the United States 
need act unilaterally to safeguard its interests.  Hal Klepak argues that multilateral 
participation does not undermine U.S. interests.   He reviews how the U.S. has used 
multilateral organizations to legitimize U.S. policy in the region, gain access to the 
markets, and mobilize resources to best serve U.S. interests.  He does concede that, 
“smaller states of the Americas have sought to use multilateralism and multilateral 
 
171 Gabriel Marcella, American Grand Strategy for Latin America in the Age of Resentment, (Army 
War College Strategic Studies Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA, September 2007) 
http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA472930 (accessed 30 November 2007), 46-47. 
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institutions to restrain the influence of the United States and its behavior in the western 
hemisphere.”172  Klepak provides interesting insight into the inner workings of Latin 
American multilateralism, asserting that any moments of constraint only occur “when 
U.S. vital interests tend not to be involved and where Latin American or more recently 
Canadian actions to limit U.S. unilateralism do not negatively affect goals perceived to be 
key to Washington.”173 Klepak concludes that the U.S. role in multilateral institutions in 
the region are characterized by power asymmetries that has led to the U.S.’s success in 
advancing its interests.  However, he notes that when Latin American countries have 
been able to find counterbalances to U.S. power, “they were able to restrain the U.S. 
more effectively.”  By his own concession, Klepak acknowledges the soft balancing 
potential of international organizations, both for large and small states.   
C. SMALL STATES AND FUTURE TRENDS 
If anything is to be learned in the Venezuelan experience, it is that small states 
continue to face incredible hurdles in acquiring parity in the international system, despite 
the increasing interconnected character of that system.  Rothstein’s definition of Small 
Powers holds true today – “a state which recognizes that it can not obtain security 
primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that is must rely fundamentally on the aid of 
other states, institutions, processes or developments to do so.”174  During the height of 
the Cold War, Robert Rothstein wrote on the changing role of small powers in 
international politics.  In regards to the relationship between “Small Powers” and “Great 
Powers,” Rothstein writes, “True independence, an independence which is assured 
whatever the status of Great Power relationships, still escapes the grasp of Small Powers.  
If anything seems capable of altering this condition, it is the dispersion of nuclear 
weapons to more and more states, or so it seems.”175  Rothstein is writing during a period 
 
172 Klepak, Hal.  “Power Multiplied or Power Restrained? The United States and Multilateral 
Institutions in the Americas.” In U.S. Hegemony and International Organizations: The United States and 
Multilateral Institutions by Rosemary Foot et al. (NY: Oxford University Press, Inc., 2003), 239. 
173 Ibid., 240. 
174 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 29. 
175 Ibid., 265. 
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that witnessed an increased focus on nuclear proliferation, when “Small Powers” like 
India were reaching the intersection between “external threat and internal capability to 
produce a bomb.”176  Since the end of the Cold War, very few states have pursued 
nuclear weapons and those who have tried have faced nearly insurmountable obstacles 
put in place by the United States and other large powers.  All the same, Rothstein’s 
concern about nuclear proliferation and small powers should still resonate today.  When 
states like Venezuela with large amounts of money at its disposal strengthen ties with 
states like Iran whose existing nuclear program is under intense scrutiny, alarm bells 
should be ringing.  These alarm bells should get louder when Hugo Chavez is outspoken 
about Iran’s right to develop nuclear technology without international oversight. 
This thesis does not purport that small states will pursue nuclear weapons as a 
method to counter hegemonic pretenses.  Most small states have neither the money, 
industrial, or intellectual capacity to pursue such a program.  It merely highlights that 
when small states align themselves with those states already heading down the nuclear 
rabbit hole, the larger powers should take heed.   
But soft balancing is not about hard power resources like nuclear weapons, it is 
about utilizing international institutions and garnering support to raise the cost of doing 
business for the hegemonic power under the status quo.  It is not evident yet if Hugo 
Chavez has grasped this strategy or if his Bolivarian Revolution will be successful.  What 
is important to take from this study is the avenues which Chavez has pursued to challenge 
United States’ preponderance in the international beyond his antagonistic rhetoric, and to 
investigate whether or not this approach is being pursued by other small powers. 
 
176 Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 312. 
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